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Youngstown Revisited 
by CHRISTOPHER BRYANT AND CARL TOBIAS' 
One half century ago, President Harry S. Truman promulgated 
an Executive Order that authorized federal government seizure and 
operation of the nation's steel mills to support United States partici-
pation in the Korean conflict.1 The president relied on his power as 
commander-in-chief of American armed forces, other executive 
authority provided by Article II in the United States Constitution, the 
need for sustaining the American military effort, and temporal exi-
gencies. Eight weeks later, the United States Supreme Court held 
that Truman lacked any power to seize the property of American 
steel companies in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.2 
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated 
an Executive Order that authorized trial by military commissions of 
non-United States citizens whom the American government suspects 
of terrorism in domestic cases and concomitantly denied these per-
sons access to the federal courts.3 Bush, like Truman, premised this 
*Faculty Members, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Ve-
gas. We wish to thank Tom Baker, Ben Bateman, Margo M. Lambert, Bruce Markell, 
Tom B. McAffee, Briant Platt and Peggy Sanner for valuable ideas, Angeline Garbett and 
Genny Schloss for processing, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors 
that remain are ours. 
1. Exec. Order No. 10340 (directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession 
of and operate the plants and facilities of certain steel companies), 17 FED. REG. 3139 
(Apr. 10, 1952). 
2. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL 
SEIZURE CASE (1994); Grant McConnell, THE STEEL SEIZURE OF 1952 (THE INTER-
UNIVERSITY CASE PROGRAM NO. 52, 1960); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME 
COURT 76, 151-92, 220, 273 (2001); ALAN F. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE (1958). 
3. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [herein-
after Bush Order]. See also Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 
(Mar. 21, 2002) at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol.pdf [hereinafter 
DOD Order]. 
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action on executive power, namely his authority as commander-in-
chief, the necessity to wage the war against terrorism following the 
September 11 attacks, and time restraints. 
The respective presidential initiatives five decades apart can be 
distinguished. For instance, the chief executives addressed discrete 
factual scenarios, which created distinct national emergencies. Care-
ful scrutiny, however, reveals that the two endeavors are in fact 
strikingly analogous. For example, both the Truman and Bush efforts 
raised profound separation of powers concerns. Both presidents re-
sorted to their executive authority derived from Article II as justifica-
tions for extraordinary domestic actions, when fighting undeclared 
"wars." The leaders, therefore, exercised legislative power in deroga-
tion of the Constitution's express proviso that assigns Congress, not 
the president, lawmaking responsibility. 
The specific Bush Administration claim to executive authority 
would prescribe federal court jurisdiction, an enumerated power that 
Articles I and III confer on Congress in explicit terms, while it would 
proscribe even threshold judicial consideration of the initiative's con-
stitutionality. This assertion of authority is at once unsupported, im-
perial, and sweeping. Indeed, the November order could undermine 
not only legislative, but also judicial power, and, thus, jeopardize the 
finely wrought balance among the federal government's tripartite, co-
equal branches. Because the Bush endeavor more substantially in-
vades Congress' province and concentrates federal authority in the 
president than the corresponding Truman Administration action, 
Youngstown applies with greater force to the fundamental questions 
the recent initiative presents. 
These propositions mean the Executive Order issued last No-
vember 13, 2001 warrants analysis through the prism of Youngstown 
on the landmark decision's fiftieth anniversary. Our article under-
takes this effort and ascertains that the president has no power to bar 
those individuals who are covered by the Bush Order from invoking 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.4 
We first explore the origins and development of the critical is-
4. Litigation challenging detainment or military trials outside the United States may 
raise additional statutory and constitutional issues that are beyond this article's scope. See 
infra note 10 and accompanying text. See also John Mintz, Qatar Lawyer Builds Case for 
Detainees At Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, May 13, 2002, at A3 (discussing litigation 
challenging detainment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). See generally Law and 
the War on Terrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399-834 (2002); Neal K. Katya! & 
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1259 (2002). 
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sues, which implicate the Constitution, judicial jurisdiction, and inter-
branch authority. The section assesses relevant constitutional text, 
applicable history, and governing Supreme Court case precedent. It 
finds that specific language in the Constitution bestows on Congress, 
rather than the chief executive, almost plenary power to establish the 
federal courts and to delineate their jurisdiction. 
The article next evaluates legal measures that responded to the 
September 11 terrorist strikes. Our focus is the USA PA TRI OT 
ACT and the Bush Order for which we survey considerable back-
ground information. Illustrative are the statute's legislative history as 
well as pronouncements related to the enactment and the November 
order by legislators, the Chief Executive, and Cabinet members, in-
cluding Attorney General John Ashcroft and Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld. 
The third part examines the "police action" in Korea during the 
early 1950s. We canvass numerous presidential administrations' re-
quests that Congress authorize executive branch seizure of various 
industrial enterprises as a technique for settling labor-management 
disputes and review ways in which lawmakers treated these overtures. 
This segment then analyzes the Truman Administration order that 
seized the steel mills. The portion ends with an assessment of the Su-
preme Court opinion in Youngstown, which invalidated the seizure, 
and the meaning subsequently accorded that crucial decision. 
Section four applies Youngstown to the November Executive 
Order and ascertains that the directive is unconstitutional, insofar as 
it precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction granted by 
federal statute. President Bush's claim of power usurps legislative 
authority that the Constitution explicitly reserves for Congress: the 
political branch Articles I and III power to establish the judiciary and 
designate its jurisdiction. 
The article concludes by urging the Bush Administration not to 
invoke the Order's provision that purportedly eliminates any federal 
court scrutiny of, or intervention in, detainment or trials authorized 
by the directive. We believe that this assertion of power would erode 
legislative and judicial authority, upsetting the meticulously calibrated 
equilibrium among the federal government's three coordinate 
branches. 
I. Article III, Constitutional History and the Jurisdictional 
Question 
Section 7(b) of the November 13, 2001 Executive Order provides 
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in pertinent part that the "military tribunals [established by the direc-
tive] shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by" any 
person subject to the Order, who: 
shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any pro-
ceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or 
proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of 
the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any 
foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.5 
The directive's expansive terminology sweeps within the compass of 
its prohibition all courts - federal, state, foreign, or international -
apart from the military commissions created by the Order itself. Our 
focus is the Bush Administration's attempt in section 7(b) to strip 
federal courts of jurisdiction granted by statutes that implement Arti-
cle III of the Constitution.6 
Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction and may 
adjudicate a dispute only when Congress expressly empowers them to 
do so and, therefore, differ from state courts, which are presumed to 
enjoy general jurisdiction.7 Federal courts have jurisdiction solely 
over those "Cases" and "Controversies" specified in Article III, Sec-
tion 2 of the United States Constitution.8 Moreover, this constitu-
tional enumeration is not self-executing; a federal statute must ex-
plicitly authorize the exercise of federal judicial power.9 Thus, insofar 
as particular cases or controversies that implicate the Bush Order 
5. Bush Order, supra note 3; see also infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (as-
sessing Bush Order). 
6. Therefore, we do not evaluate the legality of the Order's attempt to deprive state, 
foreign, or international courts or tribunals of power to accord those individuals whom the 
directive covers relief. The Supreme Court sharply limited the ability of state courts to 
grant people in federal officers' custody relief in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397, 412 (1872). 
See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598, 605 (1821) (denying state courts the power to 
issue writs of mandamus to federal officers). See generally MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 156-64 (2d ed. 1990); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW 
OF FEDERAL COURTS 41 (6th ed. 2002); Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interfer-
ence, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347-59 (1930). 
7. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 257 (3d ed. 1999); LAWRENCE 
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 125 (1973); RICHARD POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 296 (1996); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
207 (3d ed. 2000); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, at 27. 
8. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. 
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (5th ed. 2001); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 385; WRIGHT & 
KANE, supra note 6, at 61-62. 
9. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1988). See also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 258; JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 9-
13 (3d ed. 1999); REDISH, supra note 6, at 25. 
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might, for whatever reason, exceed the scope of any legislative juris-
dictional grant, the section 7(b) prohibition on federal court jurisdic-
tion's exercise is mere surplusage.10 Therefore, our concern is with 
the category of lawsuits for which federal statutes provide federal 
courts with jurisdiction, but which section 7(b) purports to insulate 
from any judicial scrutiny. Of course, the administration officials who 
drafted the Bush Order must have intended to affect precisely that 
group of cases by mentioning "any court of the United States" in sec-
tion 7(b). 
Whether a federal court retains jurisdiction, even to consider a 
covered individual's request for any form of relief, in exactly such a 
suit - in other words, whether section 7(b) fails in its apparent pur-
pose - is a question that a federal judge must address at the litigation's 
outset, regardless of how strong the case is on the merits. As the Su-
preme Court recently admonished the lower federal courts, "[t]he re-
quirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter 
'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the 
United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception."'11 The Court 
stressed that, absent subject matter jurisdiction, a federal judge lacks 
authority to resolve on the merits even the clearest legal issue: 
"Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. 
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, 
the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact 
10. Thus, even if, as we argue below, Bush had no power to proscribe federal court 
jurisdiction, federal courts may lack jurisdiction to address claims raised by or on behalf of 
some persons subject to the Order. Cf Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 968 (D.C. 
Cir. 1949) (reversing district court finding that no federal court had statutory jurisdiction 
to entertain habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of German nationals accused of war 
crimes and held in custody by U.S. military in Germany). Whether denial of any judicial 
remedy would violate Article III or the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is a sepa-
rate issue beyond this article's scope. Id. at 967 (finding unconstitutional withdrawal of 
statutory authorization to grant writ), rev'd, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 
(1950) (denying relief without clarifying whether petitioners' custody was lawful or simply 
beyond federal court scrutiny). See also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(reading Eisentrager to preclude jurisdiction to entertain petitions for the writ of habeas 
corpus filed by detainees held by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba): RICHARD 
H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 365 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; WRIGHT & KANE, supra 
note 6, at 47, 298; Jordan P. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 
23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-25 (2001); Wayne E. Thomas, Note, Federal Courts-Habeas 
Corpus - Jurisdiction, 28 TEX. L. REV. 727 (1950). 
11. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting 
Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). See generally TRIBE, supra 
note 7, at 389; Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal 
Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
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and dismissing the cause." 12 For these reasons, whenever a person af-
fected by the Bush Order asks a federal court for relief from any ac-
tion taken pursuant to the directive, the federal judge who receives 
the person's plea must determine whether section 7(b) deprives the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction it would otherwise exercise pursu-
ant to federal legislation that implements Article III, Section 2 in the 
Constitution. Although section 7(b) purports to strip courts of juris-
diction, we conclude below that the Bush Order unconstitutionally in-
trudes upon the province of Congress, at least to this extent. 
Thus, in any case in which individuals whom the directive gov-
erns invoke federal court jurisdiction, most probably under the stat-
utes empowering federal judges to grant the writ of habeas corpus in 
broadly defined classes of cases,13 the federal courts must consider the 
question that we address here, notwithstanding the relative merits of 
any claims for relief asserted. Because the issue presented by section 
7(b) concerns the courts' subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, 
requires threshold resolution, the arguments we elaborate below to 
support our conclusion that section 7(b) is unconstitutional must be 
assessed independent of certain controversial, ongoing debates. 
These debates include those concerning the extent of constitutional 
rights possessed by non-United States citizens,14 the Bill of Rights' 
12. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex Parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869)). 
The Supreme Court explained: 
Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The statutory and (especially) 
constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation 
and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, 
and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects. 
For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or 
federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court 
to act ultra vires. 
Id. at 101- 02 (citations omitted). 
13. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241-55 (1994); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1337-467; 
JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1998); IRA ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS (1998); TRIBE, 
supra note 7, at 300; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, at 352-69. See generally Mintz, supra 
note 4, at A3 (discussing pending litigation). 
14. Compare TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS 10 (Jan. 
4, 2002) available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS] (Aliens present in the United States, even unlawfully, 
are entitled to due process), with Griffin Bell, The Constitution Doesn't Protect Foreign 
Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2001, at A20 (stating "Supreme Court has not decided 
definitively whether illegal aliens are protected by the Fourth Amendment"). See also 
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 968-73; Kenneth Anderson, A Qualified Dffense of Military Com-
missions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 590, 611-13 (2002); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 953, 978-88 (2002); Philip Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in 
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applicability to persons accused of committing war crimes,15 whether 
the Order "suspend[s)" the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" 
and, if so, whether the rigorous conditions in Article I, Section 9, 
Clause 2 are satisfied.16 Similarly immaterial to our contentions are 
whether the substantive commands of the Bush Order, as distinct 
from section 7(b)'s attempt to abrogate the federal judicial power, re-
ceive support under World War II .precedents, such as Ex Parte 
Quirin,11 or fail the test enunciated by the Reconstruction Era ruling 
Ex Parte Milligan. 18 It warrants emphasis that the Court, in both 
cases, exercised federal judicial authority and resolved challenges to 
the constitutionality of presidential orders on the merits - performing 
just the kind of judicial scrutiny of executive action that section 7 (b) 
of the Bush Order attempts to preclude.19 Our thesis is that, despite 
the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441 (2002); Paust, supra note 
10. 
15. Compare ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 10 (non-
citizens, whether "lawfully in the U.S., are entitled to [] Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
[rights] before criminal penalties may be imposed"), with Bell, supra note 14 (asserting 
that "counter-foreign terrorism, as distinct from law enforcement, is not generally subject 
to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment"). See also 
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 299-300; Anderson, supra note 14, at 613-31; CRIMES OF WAR: 
WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 130 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999); Winging 
it at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at A28 [hereinafter Winging it at Guan-
tanamo]. 
16. ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 11 (finding Bush Order 
to "not expressly suspend" habeas corpus writ and opining that it is "most unlikely that it 
could."); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289-90 (2001); Richard Fallon, Applying the Suspen-
sion Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1070-71 (1998); Gerald Neu-
man, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
961, 969-87 (1998); Gerald Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immi-
gration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1964 (2000). 
17. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See also Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteurs' Trial, 11 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 131 (1943); Daniel J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996); 
George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribu-
nals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635, 640-42 (2002). 
18. 71 U.S. 2 (1866). See generally CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 182-252 (1971); HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 369; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259 (6th ed. 2000); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 299. 
19. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25; Milligan, 71 U.S. at 109-17. See also Viet Dinh, Fore-
word: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 405-06 
(2002). The proclamation in Quirin resembles§ 7(b). Compare Proclamation No. 2561, 7 
FED. REG. 5101 (1942), with Bush Order, supra note 3, § 7(b); see also Noah Feldman, 
Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 471 (2002). Some rea-
son that Quirin's merits resolution of saboteurs' claims shows § 7(b) is unconstitutional, 
and, thus, deserves only cursory analysis. See ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, su-
pra note 14, at 11; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 4, at 1263 n.12, 1281-84. We also find§ 7(b) 
unconstitutional, see infra text accompanying notes 250-67, but the issue requires thorough 
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section 7(b), the federal courts, and ultimately the United States Su-
preme Court, can exercise judicial power and decide on the merits 
these and other constitutional issues raised by the Order's substantive 
provisions. We do not, however, address how the courts should re-
solve any of these merits issues. Accordingly, we do not contend that 
the Bush Order's authorization of detention and military trial of cov-
ered individuals necessarily violates the Constitution in every, or even 
in any, instance. 
The remainder of part I briefly reviews the constitutional text, 
history, and caselaw establishing that Congress, not the President, is 
the political branch of the federal government that the Constitution 
empowers to prescribe federal court jurisdiction. Neither our conclu-
sion nor its support is at all novel or controversial; to the contrary, the 
proposition is uncontested. Nevertheless, a concise survey of these 
arguments and their underlying substantiation is essential, as they af-
ford one predicate for our perhaps more controversial conclusion -
namely, that the Constitution's express authorization of Congress as 
the institution to create the federal courts and prescribe their jurisdic-
tion by necessary implication denies this power to the President when 
acting alone. 
A. Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court 
Beginning at the apex of the federal judicial hierarchy, Article 
III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides the categories of cases over 
which "the supreme Court shall have Appellate Jurisdiction, both as 
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make."20 The High Court has long held that this 
analysis, as Quirin is not dispositive. The Court identified no constitutional basis to ignore 
the proclamation's jurisdiction-stripping terms, and alternatively suggested the merits 
holding meant it had "no occasion to decide" about jurisdiction, which the U.S. did not 
contest. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. See generally Lloyd Cutler, Lessons On Tribunals-From 
1942, WALL ST. J., Nov. 31, 2001, at A9; Paust, supra note 10. 
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Since Ex Parte Bollman, the 
Court has construed federal statutes empowering it to grant the writ of habeas corpus (of-
ten called the Court's power to grant an "original" writ to distinguish this jurisdiction from 
its review of a lower court through certiorari power) as creating an alternative way to re-
view a lower court decision denying the writ. 8 U.S. 75, 100 (1807); see also Ex Parte Yer-
ger, 75 U.S. 85, 98 (1869) (in proper cases the Court, under the 1789 Act and all later acts 
that give "jurisdiction in cases of habeas corpus may, in the exercise of its appellate power, 
revise the decisions of the inferior courts of the United States, and relieve from unlawful 
imprisonment authorized by them, except in cases within some limitations of the jurisdic-
tion by Congress") (emphasis added); FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 558-618. By placing 
this class of cases within the Court's "appellate jurisdiction," the Court avoided finding 
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so-called "exceptions clause" of Article III authorizes lawmakers to 
enact statutes denying the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over 
cases that the specific enumeration in Article III would otherwise in-
clude. 
The Court's pathbreaking decision Ex Parte McCardle was one 
of the earliest, and most dramatic, judicial articulations of this princi-
ple.21 In circumstances remarkably similar to those of today, United 
States military authorities imprisoned Mccardle, who was a civilian 
and a vocal critic of congressional reconstruction policy, pending trial 
before a military commission.22 McCardle petitioned the circuit court 
for the southern district of Mississippi, where he was detained, for a 
writ of habeas corpus, and ironically invoked the February 5, 1867 
expansion by the Reconstruction Congress of federal court power to 
grant the writ.23 McCardle asserted various challenges to his con-
finement's legality and specifically alleged that the Military Recon-
struction Act,24 which authorized trial of southern civilians before 
military tribunals, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial 
that a statute granting it authority to entertain an "original" petition for the writ unconsti-
tutionally extended its "original Jurisdiction" within Article Ill's meaning. Bollman, 8 U.S. 
at 101 (thus distinguishing Marbury v. Madison's conclusion that the Judiciary Act of 1789 
provision empowering the Court to grant a writ of mandamus as an original matter vio-
lated Article Ill's limitation on its "original Jurisdiction"). See also HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 10, at 1340; TRIBE, supra note 7, at 268. More critical here, this same classifica-
tion of the Court's power to entertain "original" petitions for the habeas corpus writ as 
part of its "appellate Jurisdiction" within Article III also means that Congress' power to 
make "Exceptions" to this jurisdiction apparently covers the Court's power to entertain 
"original" petitions for the writ. See REDISH, supra note 6, at 27, 48; Dallin H. Oaks, The 
"Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REV. 153. 
21. 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869). See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 433-514; TRIBE, 
supra note 7, at 271-72; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 
15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973). 
22. 74 U.S. at 507-08. See also FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 438; Van Alstyne, supra 
note 21, at 236. 
23. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 507-08. The 1867 Act states in pertinent part: 
[T]he several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of 
such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority al-
ready conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the 
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States .... 
Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 
234-36. 
24. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. See also HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 10, at 1341. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 333-43, 499-501; Stanley Kutler, 
Ex Parte McCardle: Judicial Impotency? The Supreme Court and Reconstruction Recon-
sidered, 72 AM. HIST. REV. 835, 842 (1967). 
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by an impartial jury.25 The circuit court rejected McCardle's claims, 
and he appealed this decision to the Supreme Court under the terms 
of the February 5, 1867 Act. 
In March 1868, after the Court had heard argument on the merits 
of McCardle's appeal, but before the Justices held conference on the 
matter, Congress enacted a statute providing, 
[S]o much of the act approved February 5, 1867 ... as author-
ized an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such 
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court, on appeals which have 
been, or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is hereby re-
l d 26 , pea e . 
The Court stayed action on the cause and afforded the parties an op-
portunity to be heard on the repealer's effect.27 Thereafter, a unani-
mous High Court, speaking through Chief Justice Chase, concluded it 
lacked jurisdiction over McCardle's appeal. 
The opinion by Chief Justice Chase for the Supreme Court was 
simple nearly to the point of tautology.28 The Chief Justice observed 
that Article III granted Congress the power to make exceptions to the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction and emphasized that "[i]t is hardly pos-
sible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception" than the 
1868 repealer.29 Chase continued: 
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legisla-
ture. We can only examine into its power under the Constitu-
tion; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate juris-
diction of this court is given by express words. 
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case be-
fore us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the 
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power 
to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dis-
25. See FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 455. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 
238. 
26. Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 439-
66; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, at 36; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 272; Van Al-
styne, supra note 21, at 239-41. 
27. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 509. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 241-42. 
28. Chase's "opinion made it seem quite simple[, but] the issue was by no means so 
simple as Chase made it appear in Mccardle." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 305 (1985). See gen-
erally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 242-44. 
29. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514; see U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 2. See generally NOWAK 
& ROTUNDA, supra note 18, at 36; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 272-73. 
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missing the cause.30 
The Supreme Court did precisely that, and the Chief Justice dis-
missed the McCardle appeal "for want of jurisdiction" after the jurist 
distinguished the precedents that counsel for McCardle had prof-
fered.31 The determination is significant for our purposes, because the 
decision represents a vivid illustration of the proposition that the 
Constitution vests Congress, rather than the president,32 with the 
authority to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the . Supreme 
Court.33 
B. Congressional Power Over the Original Jurisdiction of the Lower 
Federal Courts 
The first significant controversy concerning the federal judiciary 
arose in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 when the delegates 
debated whether it was advisable to establish inferior federal courts at 
all.34 On June 5, 1787, John Rutledge of South Carolina, who would 
subsequently become one of the first United States Supreme Court 
30. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 245-67. 
31. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514-15. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 455-
56. 
32. Indeed, in McCardle, the Congress had enacted the repealer over President An-
drew Johnson's veto. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 508; FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 469; Van 
Alstyne, supra note 21, at 239. 
33. This idea about the political branches' relative constitutional competence is not 
diminished by later judicial and academic conclusions that other portions of the Constitu-
tion restrict Congress' power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction: See, e.g., Ex Parte 
Yerger, 75 U.S. at 106 (holding.the Constitution's text and history justified a narrow con-
struction of the 1868 repealer as affecting only appeals to the Court under the 1867 Act, 
thus leaving undisturbed power to grant writ under other, prior jurisdictional grants); 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a statute pur-
porting to deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction in certain cases in which recipients of 
presidential pardons brought claims against the United States); cf Battaglia v. General 
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) (reasoning that Fifth Amendment due process 
guarantee limits Congress' power over state and federal court jurisdiction). See also James 
E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior 
Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1436-42 (2000) (providing recent review of enduring 
academic debate over Constitution's limits on Congress' Article III power to govern the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985); John Harrison, The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 203 (1997); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Bernard J. 
Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1997); Law-
rence Gene Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998). 
34. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 62-66 (1966); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 2-4. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 
8; REDISH, supra note 6, at 7-8. 
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Justices, opposed the creation of lower federal courts, "arguing that 
the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in 
the first instance[,] the right of appeal to the supreme national tribu-
nal being sufficient to secure national rights [and) uniformity" of deci-
sions.35 The view espoused by Rutledge prevailed when the delegates 
voted,36 although James Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania had both asserted the need for lower federal courts. 37 
Fortunately, this ballot did not prove to be dispositive, as Madison 
and Wilson snatched victory from the jaws of defeat by immediately 
proposing a compromise measure - "that the National Legislature be 
empowered to institute inferior tribunals,"38 while they "observed that 
there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, 
and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish 
them."39 Of course, this suggestion, thereafter denominated "the 
Madisonian compromise,"40 secured the Convention's approval. The 
idea is embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which 
provides "The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court," and Article III, Section 1, which 
states "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish."41 Moreover, the nascent national 
legislature promptly created the lower federal courts and prescribed 
their jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.42 
In Sheldon v. Sill,43 the Supreme Court concluded that the Con-
35. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand, 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter "Farrand"]. Roger Sherman of Connecticut joined in opposing 
lower courts, stressing "the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when 
the existing State Courts would answer the same purpose." Id. at 125. 
36. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 124-25; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 4; REDISH, 
supra note 6, at 8. 
37. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 125. See generally BOWEN, supra note 34, at 62-66. 
38. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 125. See also IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON, 
FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1950); GARY WILLS, JAMES MADISON (2002); WRIGHT 
& KANE, supra note 6, at 2. 
39. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 125; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 4. 
40. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 8; REDISH, supra note 6, at 8. See gen-
erally Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Com-
promise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39. 
41. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 9; art. III,§ 1. 
42. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 9-12. 
See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT (1927); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). 
43. 49 U.S. 441 (1850). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 358-65; 
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stitution's grant to Congress of the greater power to determine "from 
time to time" whether any inferior federal courts should be "or-
dain[ ed] and establish[ ed]" included the lesser power of creating 
these courts but vesting the tribunals with jurisdiction over less than 
all the categories of cases and controversies enumerated in Article 
111.44 The High Court, therefore, upheld the constitutionality of the 
section in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which precluded federal courts 
from hearing cases when the diversity of the parties resulted from the 
assignment of a chose in action.45 Sill, the plaintiff-assignee, a citizen 
of New York, who had sued a citizen of Michigan, contended that the 
anti-assignment provision of the Judiciary Act violated Article Ill's 
command that "[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall ex-
tend to ... Controversies ... between Citizens of different States. "46 
The High Court rejected this assertion and stated: 
It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had ordained 
and established the inferior [federal] courts, and distributed 
to them their respective powers, they could not be restricted 
or divested by Congress. But as it has made no such distribu-
tion, one of two consequences must result, - either that each 
inferior court created by Congress must exercise all the judi-
cial powers not given to the Supreme Court, or that Con-
gress, having the power to establish the courts, must define 
their respective jurisdictions. The first of these inferences 
has never been asserted, and could not be defended with any 
show of reason, and if not, the latter would seem to follow as 
a necessary consequence. And it would seem to follow, also, 
that, having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold 
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enu-
merated controversies. Courts created by statute can have 
no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. No one of 
them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively con- · 
ferred on another, or withheld from all.47 
Having thus demonstrated the constitutionality of the anti-
assignment proviso that lawmakers had included in the Judiciary Act, 
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgment for want of ju-
REDISH, supra note 6, at 29-30; TRIBE, supra note 7, at 276; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 
6, at 47-48. 
44. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-49. See also U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1; Harrison, supra note 
33, at 205; Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Redirect the Jurisdiction of the 
Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839, 842-44 (1976); 
supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
45. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-50. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994); supra note 42. 
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 193-94 
(discussing Sheldon). 
47. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-49; Rotunda, supra note 44, at 842-44. 
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risdiction, observing that "the disposal of the judicial power (except 
in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress. "48 
This segment of the article has examined the premise for the 
longstanding proposition that the Constitution entrusts the legislative 
branch with authority over federal court jurisdiction, subject to cer-
tain limited restraints. Less well settled is the corollary idea that the 
Constitution's grant of this power to Congress by implication denies it 
to the chief executive acting without statutory authorization. The 
Youngstown determination, which we discuss below in part Ill, pro-
vides the framework for analyzing presidential assertions of power to 
prescribe federal court jurisdiction independent of Congress. Before 
exploring that critical precedent, however, the next section summa-
rizes the federal legal response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
II. Federal Legal Developments In Counterterrorism After 
September 11 
Congress and the President have both changed federal law in im-
portant ways since September 11, 2001. This part assesses the legal 
responses of the federal government's political branches to the un-
precedented terrorist strikes. We generally conclude, respecting sev-
eral significant issues addressed by the Bush Order, that the Admini-
stration first sought legislative authorization for its initiative, which 
Congress denied, and then arrogated to itself through the November 
13 Executive Order the requested power (including some authority 
that it had not even pursued). 
A. Legislative History of the USA PATRIOT ACT of2001 
As the United States reeled from the severe blow inflicted by the 
September 11th terrorist attacks and the country groped towards 
equilibrium in the strikes' immediate wake, some federal legislative 
action clearly became inevitable.49 Nonetheless, there remained sub-
stantial uncertainty about what precise form the response of senators 
and representatives would assume.50 
48. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449; Harrison, supra note 33, at 205. As with Congress' power 
over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the existence of constitutional limits on 
how substantially Congress exercises its power over lower federal court jurisdiction does 
not diminish the force of the authority demonstrating that the Constitution grants this 
power to Congress, not the President. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. 
49. See Bush Seeks to Expand Legal Arsenal Against Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
18, 2001, at A24. See also Richard D. Parker, Homeland: An Essay on Patriotism, 25 
HAR\(. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 407, 427 {2002). 
50. Ted Bridis, Justice Department Asks Congress to Clear Wide Ranging 
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Just over a week after the terrorists attacked the United States, 
the Bush Administration submitted to Congress proposed legislation, 
titled the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 ("ATA"), which addressed a 
wide spectrum of issues regarding law-enforcement, immigration, and 
counterterrorism efforts.51 In the highly-charged atmosphere follow-
ing the brutal strikes and amidst widespread fears of additional, even 
more deadly, assaults, senators and representatives encountered ex-
traordinary political pressure to accede to the President's sugges-
tions.52 Indeed, the Senate had suspended the upper chamber's nor-
mal operating procedures and passed through voice-vote in a late-
night session on September 13 various appropriation riders, which 
granted numerous requests from President Bush for increased coun-
terterrorism authority.53 However, by the next week, the congres-
sional leadership recognized the need for greater deliberation about a 
number of the Administration's legislative recommendations and 
scheduled hearings before the Senate and House Judiciary Commit-
tees.54 
Sections 202 and 203 of the Bush Administration draft proposal 
had the greatest relevance for the matters that the November 13, 2001 
Executive Order would subsequently address. Section 202 would 
have authorized indefinite detention of any non-citizen whom the At-
torney General "has reason to believe may commit, further, or facili-
Antiterrorism Legislation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A4; see also Kristen Choo, Con-
troversial Cure, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 20. 
51. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (Sept. 19, 2001), at 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/ 20010919_ata_bill_draft; American Values on 
Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at B16 (hereinafter American Values on Trial). 
52. John Lancaster, Hill Puts Brakes on Expanding Police Powers, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 30, 2001, at A6 (noting that in "days after September 11, [opinion polls showed] 
Americans overwhelmingly favored stronger police powers, even at the expense of per-
sonal freedom"); Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups 
Unite To Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at Al 7 (reporting that on Sept. 17, 
2001, the Attorney General said, "[T]errorists with links to those who committed last 
week's attacks might still be operating in the United States and that a new set of coun-
terterrorism measures is needed to address the threat"); cf Leti Volpp, The Citizen and 
the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (discussing consolidation of a new ethnic 
identity category, subject to widespread hatred and violence, in the wake of the September 
11 terrorist attacks). 
53. Krim, supra note 52; David Abramowitz, The President, The Congress, and Use of 
Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against Interna-
tional Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (2002). See generally Parker, supra note 49, at 
427; Paust, supra note 10. 
54. Lancaster, supra note 52; see Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American 
Values on Trial, supra note 51. 
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tate acts" of terrorism, defined quite broadly.55 Section 203 would 
have vested exclusive authority to conduct federal habeas corpus re-
view of section 202 detentions in the federal courts for the District of 
Columbia.56 
Members of Congress, belonging to each major political party,57 
and civil liberty watch-dog organizations58 vociferously opposed these 
provisions. Lawmakers, who rejected the plain import of sections 202 
and 203 in the Administration's bill, aggressively questioned those 
specific provisos during the House Judiciary Committee's hearing 
conducted on September 24 and especially in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's hearing the following day. Representatives Jerrold 
Nadler (D-N.Y.) and Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.) both voiced "strong con-
cern[ s )" about the constitutional validity of section 202's authoriza-
tion for indefinite detention.59 Representative Nadler, in particular, 
observed that the provision's low threshold - whether the Attorney 
General has "reason to believe" that a non-citizen poses a threat to 
national security - would render the (geographically constrained) 
provision for federal habeas corpus review included in section 203 an 
empty, purely "ministerial" protection against potential abuses.60 
55. See AT A, supra note 51, at § 202; see Terrorism Investigation and Prosecution: 
Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2001 WL 1132689 (Sept. 25, 
2001) [hereinafter Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (statement of Sen. Specter 
quoting § 202 of the Administration's draft bill). See generally Harold Koh, The Spirit of 
the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 34-36 (2002). 
56. AT A, supra note 51, § 203. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15. 
57. Krim, supra note 52. See also American Values on Trial, supra note 51. 
58. Walter Pincus, Caution ls Urged on Terrorism Legislation: Measures Reviewed To 
Protect Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at A22. See also Editorial: No Rush On 
Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A34 (urging rejection of section "allowing indefi-
nite detention and possible deportation of aliens on the strength of no more than certifica-
tion by the attorney general," as this power must be "subject to full judicial review or the 
terrorists will have succeeded already in forcing the country to retreat from its most basic 
principles"). 
59. Draft Proposals Designed to Combat Terrorism: Hearing of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2001 WL 1132693 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter House Judiciary 
Comm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Nadler) (expressing doubts about § 202, which 
"would seem to indicate that the Attorney General has basically carte blanche, with only 
ministerial judicial review, to put someone in jail and keep them there forever with no evi-
dence"); id. (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court's been very 
clear ... that you can't keep someone in indefinite detention and be constitutional"); see 
also Koh, supra note 55, at 34-35. 
60. Representative Nadler stated, 
{J]udicial review [in§ 203 seems only to go to the] question of whether the At-
torney General has reason to believe. And there's no standards [which seems] to 
indicate that the Attorney General has basically carte blanche, with only ministe-
rial judicial review, to put someone in jail and keep them there forever with no 
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The next day, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Ma.) and Senator 
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) amplified these objections when Attorney 
General John D. Ashcroft appeared before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee to urge swift enactment of the Administration's bill.61 The 
Attorney General insisted that the sole intent underlying section 202 
was to authorize the detention of removable non-citizens while re-
moval proceedings were pending.62 After Senator Specter remarked 
that the language in section 202 was much more expansive - author-
izing the indefinite detention of any non-citizen, deportable or not63 -
the Attorney General conceded the phraseology might be overbroad 
and agreed to narrow the terminology and, therefore, reach only 
those non-citizens whom the American government was holding, 
pending their deportation under pre-existing law. 
ASHCROFT: Senator, we will be happy on the language here if 
it's unclear, or if we are mistaken. Our intention is to be able to 
detain individuals who are the subject of deportation proceed-
ings on other grounds to detain them as if they were the subject 
of deportation proceedings on terrorism grounds, which the law 
provides clearly is a mandatory detention .. 
SPECTER: Well, I think the law now gives you authority to de-
tain if you're proceeding to deport. But on this phase, it goes 
evidence." 
House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 59 (emphasis added). 
61. Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 55 (statements of Sens. 
Kennedy and Specter). See generally Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft's Ascent, THE NEW 
YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50. 
62. Attorney General Ashcroft said, 
When a person is being the subject of adjudication for being deported on 
grounds that are other than terrorism grounds, frequently that individual is not 
detained. The provision that we have in this proposal is that if the attorney gen-
eral determines that the individual meets a standard of being a threat to national 
security, et cetera, when that person during the pendency of the adjudication of 
deportment - being deported on other grounds - that person can be held in custody, 
and that's the nature of this provision. 
Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 55 (emphasis added). 
Id. 
63. Senator Specter said, 
[As] to the mandatory detention of suspected terrorists, § 202 gives broader 
powers than just having mandatory detention of someone thought to be a terror-
ist who is being held for deportation on some other lines. [It] defines detention 
of terrorists, aliens, and authorizes the attorney general to certify that an alien 
may be detained who he, quote, 'has reason to believe may commit further or fa-
cilitate acts described in Sections ... .' [A] number of sections are listed and they 
all relate to terrorism. So that on the face of this statute it appears that the 
authority to detain on that very generalized standard, without any evidentiary 
base or probable cause, would be beyond somebody who is subject to deporta-
tion on other grounds. 
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well beyond that just on those where you have some rather 
vague ... 
ASHCROFT: Well, this is a concern expressed by Senator 
Kennedy and, obviously, we need to clarify this because there is 
no - we don't want to have some thing which has an effect 
which we don't intend.64 
Nevertheless, in subsequent negotiations with Senator Patrick 
Leahy (D-Vt.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the De-
partment of Justice offered to change section 202's threshold standard 
from "reason to believe" to "reasonable grounds to believe" that the 
targeted individual would commit or aid acts of terrorism.65 The Jus-
tice Department expected this "subtle modification . . . to satisfy 
lawmakers' desire for a higher threshold of evidence,"66 even though 
the alteration did not confirm Attorney General Ashcroft's promise 
at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that the provision would 
be circumscribed to reach only those non-citizens who were subject to 
ongoing deportation proceedings while the same were pending.67 
Senator Leahy, however, held the Bush Administration to the 
promise extracted by Senators Kennedy and Specter from Attorney 
General Ashcroft.68 On October 11, 2001, the upper chamber passed 
Senate Bill 1510, which authorized the Attorney General to detain a 
non-citizen suspected of terrorist activity but also imposed the fol-
lowing restriction on the official's authority: 
(5) COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. - The At-
torney General shall place an alien detained under para-
graph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the alien 
with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the com-
mencement of such detention. If the requirement of the pre-
ceding sentence is not satisfied, the Attorney General shall 
release the alien.69 
Senator Leahy emphasized that, under the legislation adopted by 
the Senate, "if an alien is found not to be removable, he must be re-
leased from custody."70 Senate Bill 1510 also expressly provided for 
64. Id. (statements of Sen. Specter and Attorney General Ashcroft). 
65. Lancaster, supra note 52, at A6. 
66. Id. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American Values on Trial, 
supra note 51. 
67. See supra text accompanying note 64. See generally Koh, supra note 55, at 34-36. 
68. Lancaster, supra note 52, at A6. See also 147 CONG. REC. S10558 (daily ed. Oct. 
11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy recounting his office's negotiations with the Admini-
stration on proposed sections 202 and 203). 
69. S.1510, 107th Cong.§ 412 (2001), reprinted at 147 CONG. REC. S10621. 
70. 147 CONG. REC. S10558 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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federal judicial review, through habeas corpus proceedings, of "any 
action or decision relating to this section[,] including judicial review 
of the merits of" the Attorney General's certification that the legal 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the non-citizen was a ter-
rorist or otherwise presented a national security threat.11 The full 
Congress imposed the above-described, significant limitations on the 
detainment authority granted to the Attorney General and inserted 
those restrictions without substantive change in section 412 of the 
USA PATRIOT ACT, which President Bush signed into law on Oc-
tober 26, 2001.12 
In summary, during the immediate aftermath of the September 
11 attacks, the Bush Administration requested legislation that would 
have authorized the Attorney General to certify for indefinite deten-
tion any non-citizen, legal or illegal, whom the official suspected of 
being a terrorist or otherwise a national security threat, subject only 
to "ministerial" judicial review.73 Senior members of both major po-
litical parties in each house of Congress encountered extreme politi-
cal pressure to acquiesce in this request and risked political repercus-
sions in implementing what lawmakers perceived as their duty under 
the Constitution to keep the inexorable post-September 11 expansion 
of presidential police powers within constitutional limits. The Bush 
Administration, however, did not long honor this expression of legis-
lative will. As we detail below, less than three weeks after the chief 
executive signed the USA PATRIOT ACT into law, President Bush 
issued his order on military tribunals, which accorded the Executive 
Branch not only the authority that Congress had specifically rejected 
but also additional powers that the administration had neglected even 
to seek. 
71. Id. ("subjecting Attorney General's certification [to] judicial review"). 
72. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 412(a), 115 Stat. 272, 351 (2001) [hereinafter§ 412 of the Patriot Act]. It also changed 
the Administration proposal, which would have required all habeas corpus petitions to be 
filed in the District of Columbia federal courts. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
Section 412 permits original petitions to be filed in any U.S. district court otherwise having 
jurisdiction, satisfying Administration concerns about conflicting authority in different 
federal circuits with the less onerous stricture that all appeals be heard by the D.C. Circuit, 
and provides that Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit rulings would supply the "rule of deci-
sion" in all cases.§ 412, 115 Stat. at 352. See generally Koh, supra note 55, at 34. 
73. Supra note 60. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American Val-
ues on Trial, supra note 51. 
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Senators and representatives denied the request lodged by At-
torney General Ashcroft, the nation's highest-ranking legal officer, 
for authority to detain indefinitely any non-citizen whom the official 
suspected of terrorism.74 This explicit legislative rejection proved to 
be a mere temporary setback for the Bush Administration, because 
section 3 of the November 13, 2001 Executive Order granted the Sec-
retary of Defense precisely the same power. 
Section 3 authorizes and directs the Secretary of Defense to take 
into custody and "detain[] at an appropriate location ... outside or 
within the United States" all "individual[ s] subject to" the Order. 
Section 2 of the Order defines "individual subject to this order" to 
mean "any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect 
to whom [the President] determine[s] from time to time in writing 
that there is reason to believe that such individual" is an international 
terrorist dangerous to the United States or is a person who "has 
knowingly harbored one or more" such people.75 Thus, the Order 
grants to the Defense Department all of the power that the Admini-
stration had previously but unsuccessfully sought from Congress. 
Indeed, the authority claimed by the Bush Order is significantly 
broader than even that power the Administration had requested from 
legislators. The most aggressive position the Administration assumed 
before Congress was that federal habeas corpus review of detentions 
should be limited to the federal courts in the District of Columbia.76 
The Bush directive, however, would purportedly dispense altogether 
with any judicial review sought by or on behalf of "any individual 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 (discussing legislative history of§ 412 of 
the USA PATRIOT ACT). 
75. Bush Order, supra note 3, at § 2. This section also limits the Order's scope to per-
sons whom the President deems "it is in the interest of the United States [] be subject to 
this order." Id. Though this limitation grants the President discretion not to subject an 
otherwise implicated individual to the Order's terms, because that discretion is unbridled 
it does not restrain executive branch power to employ the Order's provisions against any-
one deemed by the President to be an international terrorist or one who aids or abets such 
conduct. 
76. See supra note 56. See also supra note 72 (showing Congress rejected idea and 
treated fears about conflicting authority of Administration with less onerous habeas cor-
pus venue provision); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity 
of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 252-54 (2002) (assessing the constitu-
tional authority for the Bush Order); Molly McDonough, Tribunals vs. Trials, 88 A.B.A. 
J., Jan. 2002, at 20. 
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subject to [the] order. "77 
The plain meaning of section 7(b) has received subsequent con-
firmation in the United States Department of Defense Military Order 
Number One ("DOD Order"), promulgated on March 21, 2002, 
which establishes the procedures for, and the membership of, military 
commissions authorized by the Bush Order and otherwise imple-
ments this directive.78 The DOD Order strictly forbids federal judicial 
review of any aspects of any proceeding undertaken pursuant to the 
Bush Order. The DOD Order provides, in pertinent part, for review 
of the record compiled in the trial before a military commission by a 
panel comprised of three military officers "at least one of which 
[sic] ... shall have experience as a judge."79 The DOD Order instructs 
the tribunal so constituted to "disregard any variance from proce-
dures specified in this Order or elsewhere that would not materially 
have affected the outcome of the trial before the Commission."80 
Moreover, the review panel cannot "return the case ... for further 
proceedings," unless "a majority of the (members] has formed a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a material error of law has occurred."81 
Otherwise, the panel forwards the matter to the Secretary of Defense, 
who may return the case for additional proceedings, forward the mat-
ter to the president with a recommendation regarding disposition, or 
make the final determination respecting the charge as well as the sen-
tence, if authorized by the chief executive to do so.82 Should lingering 
doubt remain that the Bush and DOD Orders preclude all further re-
view - including presumably any intervention by a federal court that is 
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction - section 6(H)(2) of the DOD 
Order expressly provides, 
[A] Commission finding as to a charge and any sentence of a 
77. Bush Order, supra note 3, § 7(b). See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 
15. 
78. DOD Order, supra note 3. See also Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Com-
missions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH, J, INT'L L. 677 (2002); John 
Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al; Deborah 
L. Rhode, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at A27. 
79. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(4). See also Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Readies 
Plans for Terror Tribunals, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al; Are Tribunal Rules Fair?, 
w ASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at Al8. 
80. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(4); see generally Margaret Graham Tebo, ABA 
Decries Detainee Handling, 88 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2002, at 21; John Mintz, Tribunal Rules Aim 
to Shield Witnesses, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at Al. 
81. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(4); see generally Mintz, supra note 78; Serrano, 
supra note 79. 
82. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(5); see generally Mintz, supra note 80. 
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Commission becomes final when the President or, if designated 
by the President, the Secretary of Defense makes a final deci-
sion thereon . . . . Any sentence made final by action of the 
President or the Secretary of Defense shall be carried out 
promptly.83 
Furthermore, the intent of the Bush Administration to preclude 
relief by federal habeas corpus does not cover only those ultimately 
tried and convicted by military commissions. In official statements 
made contemporaneously with the publication of the DOD Order, 
Defense Department officers observed that "[t]he vast majority of 
captives ... will be released if they are found innocent, sent to their 
home countries for trial or detained indefinitely without charges if the 
United States considers them too dangerous to release but lacks enough 
evidence to prosecute them."84 These comments, together with section 
6(H) of the DOD Order and section 7(b) of the Bush Order, suggest 
the Bush Administration's intent to maintain custody of suspected 
terrorists substantially beyond the terms of that authority which law-
makers granted in the USA PATRIOT ACT.85 
83. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(2). See also Mintz, supra note 78; Serrano, su-
pra note 79. 
84. See Mintz, supra note 80 (emphasis added). See also Rhode, supra note 78; Ser-
rano, supra note 79. 
85. Given the Order's express and implied prohibitions on federal court review, we 
find inadequate White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales' claim that "judicial review in 
civilian court," is preserved under the Bush Order: "anyone arrested, detained or tried in 
the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the 
commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27. This other-
wise promising concession does not offset the many indications that certification under 
Bush's Order precludes federal court review of detention, imprisonment, or imposition of 
other punishment, including death, authorized by the Order. 
First, Gonzales sharply restricted his promise of "judicial review in [the] civilian courts" to 
those "arrested, detained or tried in the United States" (query if Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
is "in the U.S."). Id. Even then, a federal habeas corpus proceeding would only treat 
challenges to the "lawfulness of [a military] commission's jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis 
added). Depending on the Administration view of the legal term "jurisdiction," it may 
well argue a federal habeas court would be limited to the ministerial task of confirming the 
President had in fact found in writing a detainee "subject to" his Order. Bush Order, su-
pra note 3, § 2; cf House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 59 (statement of Rep. 
Nadler) (voicing concern that judicial review of detentions under Administration's pro-
posed anti-terrorism bill would be "only ministerial"). Second, Gonzales justified his in-
formal view by citation to the Supreme Court case of Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), 
which reviewed challenges to President Roosevelt's World War II order authorizing trial 
of alleged Nazi saboteurs before military tribunals, not by the Bush Order's text which 
seems to preclude any judicial review. Gonzales, supra. But the Court reached the merits 
in Quirin only after the Justice Department elected "not to contest the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction." Cutler, supra note 19. However, the Bush Administration might well con-
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C. Congressional Reactions 
Two days after the President issued the executive order author-
izing indefinite detainment and trial by military tribunals, Senator 
Specter, a senior Republican, and longtime, active member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, voiced concerns on the Senate floor that 
the Chief Executive's directive exceeded his constitutional power.86 
Senator Specter insisted that "under the Constitution it is the Con-
gress that has the authority to establish the parameters and the pro-
ceedings under [military] courts."87 Accordingly, he called for the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to hold hearings that would inquire into 
the constitutional and prudential issues raised by the Bush Order.88 A 
rare colloquy next ensued between Senator Specter and Senate Judi-
ciary Chair Leahy, who publicly thanked the senator from Pennsylva-
nia on the chamber floor for raising questions related to the Bush Or-
der and promised that he would convene a committee hearing on the 
matter during the period which immediately followed the then-
impending Thanksgiving recess.89 
In fact, over a two-week time frame spanning late November and 
early December 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted 
three days of hearings on the Bush Order and received testimony 
from eighteen witnesses.9() A broad spectrum of public officials and 
constitutional scholars, who hold quite diverse political perspectives, 
test jurisdiction, relying on the Bush and DOD Orders' plain terms and, thus, force the 
courts to address the constitutional issues the Court avoided in 1942. See supra note 19. 
Finally, even if contrary to these reservations, Gonzales had clearly construed the Bush 
Order as affirmatively protecting adequate judicial review through habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, this view might not be the final word. Without questioning his integrity or good 
faith or those of other Bush staff, White House Counsel's newspaper opinion piece does 
not preclude the Administration from asserting in later litigation contrary views on the 
meaning of the Bush and DOD Orders, especially were they are closer to the Orders' 
texts. We urge President Bush to acquiesce in searching federal court review of actions 
under his Orders but Gonzales's article does not irrevocably commit the President to this 
position. See infra text accompanying note 292-93. 
86. See 147 CONG. REC. S11888-890 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Spec-
ter). 
87. Id. at S11888. See generally Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American 
Values on Trial, supra note 51. 
88. 147 CONG. REC. at S11888; see also McDonough, supra note 76; Neil A. Lewis, 
U.S. Seeking Basis to Charge War Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, at Al; Winging it 
at Guantanamo, supra note 15. 
89. 147 CONG. REC. at S11888-89 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
90. 147 CONG. REC. S13275-77 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(reviewing the hearings related to the Bush Order conducted by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee). 
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testified during those sessions. Some witnesses, such as representa-
tives of the current administration and individuals who served in sev-
eral prior ones, argued that the President's power as "Commander-in-
Chief"91 of the United States armed forces encompassed the authority 
to promulgate the Executive Order,92 although no one who offered 
testimony addressed the precise issue which we examine: presidential 
power unilaterally to preclude the exercise of federal court jurisdic-
tion created by pre-existing statute. However, additional witnesses, 
namely certain of the nation's most distinguished authorities on the 
Constitution, expressed grave reservations regarding the Order's va-
lidity, because the directive invaded the province of Congress93 or po-
tentially infringed individual rights that the Bill of Rights affirma-
tively guarantees.94 
This testimony, and subsequent developments, including the 
Bush Administration's rejection of legislative "requests ... to review 
and be consulted about the draft [DOD] regulations,"95 which imple-
ment the Bush Order, as well as the American Bar Association's 
publication of recommendations for congressional action responsive 
to the directive, prompted action by Senator Leahy.96 Exactly three 
months after the President issued the Order, Chair Leahy introduced 
a bill that "would provide the executive branch with the specific 
authorization it now lacks to use extraordinary tribunals to try mem-
bers of the al Qaeda terrorist network and those who cooperated with 
them."97 Senator Leahy, who relied in part on testimony presented at 
the Judiciary Committee hearings held during late 2001, declared his 
view that President Bush lacked the constitutional power to create 
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also infra notes 134-36, 191, 287 and accompa-
nying text. 
92. See, e.g., DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Ter-
rorism: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (statement 
of Attorney General Ashcroft) ("The president has ordered - and it is a military order, to 
the [DOD - it's part] of his responsibility as commander in chief of a nation in conflict 
[that the DOD] develop a framework that would provide full and fair proceedings."). 
93. See 147 CONG. REC. S13277 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(summarizing testimony of a number of legal experts who found that the Bush Order in-
vaded the powers of Congress). 
94. See, e.g., DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Ter-
rorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Nov. 28, 2001), at 
www.senate.gov/judiciary (testimony of Neal Katyal stating how the Bush Order would 
violate protections in the Bill of Rights). 
95. 148 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
96. See id.; ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14. 
97. 148 CONG. REC. S741 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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special military tribunals unilaterally: 
The Attorney General testified at our hearing on December 6 
that the President does not need the sanction of Congress to 
convene military commission[s], but I disagree. Military tribu-
nals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but only if 
they are backed by specific congressional authorization.98 
397 
Senator Leahy's proposed legislation would circumscribe military 
detainment and military trials much more narrowly, and impose con-
siderably greater procedural safeguards, than did the Bush Order. 
First, the bill exempts from military trial or detainment "individuals 
arrested while in the United States, since our civilian court system is 
well-equipped to handle such cases."99 Indeed, Leahy's recommended 
statute would expressly shelter from detainment and military trial not 
only American citizens but also all "alien[s] lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence."'00 Moreover, the bill would authorize military 
detainment and trial of only those persons "apprehended in Afghani-
stan, fleeing from Afghanistan, or in or fleeing from any other place 
outside the United States where there is armed conflict involving the 
Armed Forces of the United States."101 
In addition to imposing these limitations on the scope of execu-
tive branch authority to detain persons and try them in military com-
missions, Senator Leahy's proposal would provide individuals who 
are subject to these extraordinary powers significant procedural pro-
tections which neither the Bush Order nor the subsequent DOD Or-
der implementing the directive affords. 102 Most relevant to the issues 
that we consider are the Leahy bill's provisions which subject deten-
tions under its authority to the supervision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.103 The suggested 
measure would similarly provide for appellate review of military tri-
bunals' judgments in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces - an all-civilian court comprised of judges whom the 
98. Id. (emphasis added). See also Lewis, supra note 88; Winging it at Guantanamo, 
supra note 15. 
99. 148 CONG. REC. at S742. See also Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, 
S.1941, 107th Cong.§ 3 (2002). On March 20, 2002, House members introduced an identi-
cal bill. See H.R. 4035, 107th Cong. (2002). 
100. 148 CONG. REC. S744 (reprinting section-by-section analysis of S.1941). 
101. S. 1941, § 3(a)(3). See generally U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, supra note 
79; American Values on Trial, supra note 51. 
102. See S.1941, §§ 4 & 5. See also Lewis, supra note 88; Rhode, supra note 78. 
103. See S.1941, § 5(d). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994); CHRISTOPHER BANKS, 
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT (1999); JEFFREY MORRIS, CALMLY TO 
POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (2001). 
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president appoints, with Senate advice and consent, to fifteen-year 
terms - as well as further review in the United States Supreme Court 
through writ of certiorari.104 The bill introduced by Senator Leahy 
was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee which has thus 
far taken no further action on the measure.105 
In sum, President George W. Bush premised on two principal 
sources the November 13, 2001 Executive Order, which would man-
date that military commissions try certain individuals whom the gov-
ernment prosecutes for violating the laws of war and additional appli-
cable laws and which would concomitantly deprive these defendants 
of federal court access and the federal judiciary of jurisdiction. Bush 
relied on the power vested in him as the president and as the com-
mander-in-chief of the United States armed forces by the Constitu-
tion and federal statutes, particularly the congressional joint resolu-
tion that authorized deployment of military force. 
Major leaders from both political parties in each chamber, none-
theless, voiced serious concerns about whether the Bush Order was 
constitutional, which concomitantly prompted a series of oversight 
hearings and ultimately led to the introduction of proposed legisla-
tion. The Senate bill would not only substantially circumscribe the 
power asserted by President Bush but also explicitly preserve a role 
for federal courts in reviewing the Administration's actions. These 
expressions of congressional disapproval, especially combined with 
lawmakers' refusal to grant prior Administration requests for even a 
portion of the expansive authority claimed in the Bush Order, dem-
onstrate that the directive's purported abrogation of federal court ju-
risdiction clearly conflicts with legislative will. 
In analyzing the Bush Order's attempted abolition of judicial ju-
risdiction, it is important to understand that the specific terminology 
used by the Founders when they crafted the Constitution, relevant 
history of the basic document, and controlling Supreme Court case 
law demonstrate the Constitution endows Congress with virtually 
complete power to establish the federal courts and prescribe their ju-
risdiction. President Truman's assertion of constitutional authority 
for seizing the steel mills during 1952 and the High Court determina-
tion in Youngstown that the chief executive lacked the requisite 
104. S.1941, § 4(e)(2) & (3). See generally 10 U.S.C §§ 867, 942 (1994); Pub. L. No. 
103-337, 108 Stat. 2663 (1994); Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177 (1995); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 
298-99. 
105. 148 CONG. REC. S741 (noting bill's referral to Senate Committee on Armed 
Services). 
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power comprise the most directly applicable precedent. Thus, we 
comprehensively scrutinize Youngstown below. 
III. A "Police Action" in Korea, the Steel Seizure Order, and 
the Youngstown Opinion 
In this section of the article, we explore numerous relevant de-
velopments which transpired fifty years ago. The segment initially 
examines requests that several presidential administrations lodged for 
legislative authorization to employ governmental seizure as a mecha-
nism which would treat conflicts between labor and management, 
while the part discusses how senators and representatives addressed 
overtures from various chief executives. We then describe President 
Truman's steel seizure initiative, emphasizing the power that his Ex-
ecutive Order claimed for this action. The portion next analyzes the 
Supreme Court decision in Youngstown, which held the Truman Or-
der unconstitutional. The section concludes with a brief assessment 
of the meaning attributed to the pathbreaking opinion over the sub-
sequent half century. 
A. Administration Requests for Legislative Authorization and 
Congressional Responses 
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority in the Youngstown 
case, found "there is no statute that expressly authorizes the Presi-
dent to take possession of property as he did here [and no legislation] 
from which such a power can fairly be implied."106 Moreover, when 
the members of Congress were evaluating possible adoption of the 
Labor Management Relations, or Taft-Hartley, Act of 1947, lawmak-
ers explicitly rejected a proposed amendment in the measure that 
would have authorized the chief executive to use seizure as a device 
which would resolve labor disputes in national emergencies.107 
Justice Felix Frankfurter authored a concurring opinion that 
elaborated on the somewhat laconic exposition in the majority deci-
sion which Justice Black penned.108 Frankfurter traced in consum-
106. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 {1952). See also infra notes 129-130 and accom-
panying text. See generally MARCUS, supra note 2, at 1-57; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 2-6. 
107. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. See also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying 
text. See generally MARCUS, supra note 2, at 162-64: The Labor Management Relations 
and Taft-Hartley Acts are identical. 
108. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 {Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also MARCUS, su-
pra note 2, at 203. 
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mate detail back to Woodrow Wilson's presidency the sixteen prior 
circumstances when Congress had clearly provided for the "seizure of 
production, transportation, communications, or storage facilities" by 
a significant number of earlier administrations.109 The jurist corre-
spondingly determined that senators and representatives deemed this 
tool's invocation so radical as to circumscribe sharply its executive 
branch deployment. 11° Frankfurter then thoroughly documented leg-
islative consideration of the Labor Management Relations Act in 
1947, which the Justice characterized as the most recent, applicable 
congressional activity, while the jurist ascertained that lawmakers had 
in effect "said to the President: '[y]ou may not seize. Please report to 
us and ask for seizure power if you think it is needed in a specific 
situation. "'111 
B. President Truman's Steel Seizure Order 
In mid-1950, the United States entered the conflict between 
North and South Korea, although Congress never issued a formal 
declaration of war.112 During late 1951, the United Steelworkers of 
America and the principal domestic steel manufacturers became em-
broiled in a contentious dispute over applicable terms and conditions 
of workers' employment. When protracted negotiations between la-
bor and management, the conclusion of which the federal government 
had attempted to facilitate, yielded no satisfactory resolution, the 
steelworkers' union announced that it would sponsor a nationwide 
strike which was scheduled to commence on April 9, 1952. Because 
steel was an indispensable constituent for most war material, the 
Truman Administration feared that a work stoppage would seriously 
disrupt United States military participation in the Korean conflict. 
President Truman, therefore, promulgated an April 8 Executive Or-
der which instructed the Secretary of Commerce, John Sawyer, to 
seize American steel mills and operate the entities on the country's 
behalf.113 The Chief Executive premised that order on the authority 
109. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597-98. See also infra notes 121-23, 146 and accompa-
nying text. 
110. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 598. See also infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
111. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603. See also infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
112. We rely substantially in this subpart on Justice Black's opinion for the Court in 
Youngstown; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 105-07 
(1990); MARCUS, supra note 2; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 2-29; WESTIN, supra note 2; 
see also U.S. CONST. art.l, § 8, cl. 11. 
113. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 
58-82; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 29-36; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7-16. See generally 
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vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the United States 
and as president and commander-in-chief of American armed forces. 
Commerce Secretary Sawyer concomitantly issued several orders 
which requested that the presidents of the seized steel corporations 
serve as those companies' operating managers for the nation.114 The 
following day, Truman transmitted to Congress a report on his ad-
ministration's activities and twelve days thereafter he delivered sena-
tors and representatives another message; both of these missives ef-
fectively encouraged lawmakers to pass legislation, even intimating 
that members of Congress might reject the course of action which the 
President had selected.115 However, lawmakers did not respond to the 
Chief Executive's importuning.116 
C. The Youngstown Opinion 
1. Overview of the Litigation 
The country's steel producers complied under protest with the 
orders promulgated by President Truman and Commerce Secretary 
Sawyer and immediately instituted litigation in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia. The manufacturers alleged 
that neither the United States Constitution nor federal legislation 
empowered the Truman Administration to seize American steel 
companies, and the corporations sought a declaration invalidating the 
presidential and secretarial directives.117 United States District Judge 
Alexander Holtzhoff first denied the plaintiffs' request for a tempo-
rary restraining order on April 9.118 Nevertheless, United States Dis-
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83. 
114. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. See generally CHARLES SAWYER, CONCERNS OF A 
CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRAT {1968); Robert F. Banks, Steel, Sawyer, and the Executive 
Power, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 467 (1953). 
115. See Message from President Harry S. Truman to Congress, 98 CONG. REC. H3962 
(daily ed. Apr. 9, 1952); Message from President Harry S. Truman to Congress, 98 CONG. 
REC. H4192 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1952). See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 94; Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 583. See generally infra note 225. 
116. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 95-101. See gen-
erally Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 
98-99 (Spr. 1976). 
117. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. See generally MARCUS, supra note 2, at 102-03; 
MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 38; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 155; WESTIN, supra note 
2, at 26-36. 
118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978, 981 {D.D.C. 1952). 
See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 103-08; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 155-58; WESTIN, 
supra note 2, at 34-43. 
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trict Judge David A. Pine ultimately granted a preliminary injunction 
which restrained the Commerce Secretary from continuing to seize 
and possess the steel mills on April 29.119 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed Judge Pine's or-
der the same day.120 The Supreme Court deemed best the expeditious 
resolution of the case, while the Justices granted certiorari on May 3 
before the appellate court issued a final judgment, set the matter for 
argument nine days thereafter, and issued the High Court's opinion 
on June 2.121 
Justice Black, writing for the majority, affirmed the district 
court's decision.122 Justice Frankfurter observed that he joined the 
Black opinion because Frankfurter agreed with the separation of 
powers analysis undertaken by his colleague; however, Frankfurter 
trenchantly admonished that the application of the principle appeared 
substantially more complex and flexible than may have seemed at 
first glance from the determination which Black authored.123 Frank-
furter correspondingly remarked that, although diverse perceptions 
related to separation of powers might have merely reflected, "differ-
ences in emphasis and nuance, they [could] hardly be" captured by a 
single opinion and, therefore, necessitated the "individual expression 
of views in reaching a common result. "124 All four Supreme Court 
Justices - Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, William 0. Douglas, and 
Harold Burton - who joined with Black penned separate decisions, 
while Justice Tom Clark concurred in the judgment but not in Black's 
opinion.125 Chief Justice Fred Vinson wrote a dissent that Justice 
119. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 577 (D.D.C. 1952). See 
also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 108-129; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 36-41; REHNQUIST, 
supra note 2, at 158-168; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 51-72. See generally Youngstown, 343 
U.S. at 584. 
120. See Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See gener-
ally Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584; MARCUS, supra note 2, at 130-148; MCCONNELL, supra 
note 2, at 42-43; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 167-68; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 73-87. 
121. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 147-49; 
McCONNELL, supra note 2, at 44; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 167-68; WESTIN, supra 
note 2, at 88-95. 
122. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. See generally infra notes 128-45 and accompa-
nying text. 
123. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also infra notes 
128-145 and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 146-62, 174-88 and accompany-
ing text. 
124. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
125. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., 
concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 
660 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment). See also id. at 582 (affording Justice Black's 
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Stanley Reed and Justice Sherman Minton joined.126 Shortly after the 
High Court had issued its determination, the United Steelworkers of 
America conducted a strike lasting for 53 days, which had practically 
no discernable effect on United States military involvement in the 
Korean conflict, because a steel shortage failed to materialize while 
the labor union and the manufacturers ultimately settled their differ-
ences.121 
2. The Majority Opinion in Youngstown 
Justice Black declared that presidential authority, if any relevant 
power existed, to issue the order must be prescribed in a federal stat-
ute or in the United States Constitution.128 The jurist could discover 
neither legislation expressly authorizing the chief executive to seize 
private property nor congressional enactments from which such a 
prerogative might fairly be implied.129 Black specifically observed that 
no statute in explicit words permitted reliance on the seizure proce-
dure as a means for addressing disputes over employment conditions 
between labor and management, while senators and representatives 
had clearly refused to approve the particular approach for resolving 
these controversies.130 When lawmakers considered passage of the 
Labor Management Relations Act in 1947, the legislative branch re-
jected a recommended amendment in the statute which would have 
empowered the federal government to seize various industrial proc-
esses during national emergencies.131 "Consequently, the plan Con-
gress adopted in the Act did not provide for seizure under any cir-
cumstances. "132 
If President Truman possessed the requisite authority to promul-
gate the order seizing the country's steel mills, the Constitution must 
give the officer this power. The United States government, when de-
opinion); infra notes 146-213 and accompanying text 
126. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting). 
127. See MARCUS, supra note 2, at 249-260; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 47-53; 
WESTIN, supra note 2, at 170-71. See also REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 189-92. 
128. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. See also infra note 210 and accompanying text. See 
generally JOHN FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS (1949); 
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK (1994). 
129. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. See also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
130. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-86. See also supra note 106, infra notes 154-55 and 
accompanying text. 
131. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). See also supra notes 106, 110 and 
accompanying text; infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
132. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. See also infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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fending the Truman Administration's issuance of the Executive Or-
der, argued that the Supreme Court should infer presidential author-
ity from the aggregate of those powers which the chief executive 
claimed under the essential document and did not pursue the conten-
tion that the president had depended upon an express grant of consti-
tutional authority.133 
Black then reviewed the various sources from which the power 
Truman asserted was said to emanate. The Justice first declared that 
the initiative could not be sustained by denominating it an exercise of 
the president's military authority as commander-in-chief of American 
armed forces. 134 Black rejected governmental reliance on numerous 
cases, which accorded military leaders with responsibility for daily 
combat in a war theater broad powers to seize private property and 
prevent labor disputes from disrupting industrial production.135 He 
characterized Truman's seizure effort as a "job for the Nation's law-
makers, not for its military authorities."136 
The jurist next determined that the Executive Order which the 
administration had adopted would receive no support from the sev-
eral constitutional provisions that bestowed executive power on the 
president. The document's framework, which grants the official 
authority for taking care that the "laws are faithfully executed re-
futes" the notion of the president as lawmaker, while this structure 
limits the chief executive's functions in the legislative process to rec-
ommending statutory proposals which the officer considers advisable 
and vetoing measures the official deems inappropriate.137 Moreover, 
Black found the Constitution clear and unequivocal that Congress 
"shall make the laws which the President is to execute," and the Jus-
tice quoted extensively from the provision in Article I that "all legis-
lative Powers be vested in a Congress [authorized to] make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the 
133. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 158-60, 195-98 and accompa-
nying text. 
134. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 141, 191-92 and accompanying 
text. 
135. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. He found theater of war an expanding concept but 
could not hold constitutional the president's executive order. Id. See also infra note 191 
and accompanying text. 
136. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 141, 192 and accompanying 
text. 
137. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA; supra note 18, at 256; infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
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enumerated powers and all others afforded the federal government.138 
The jurist described the Truman Administration directive as an en-
actment and carefully detailed how the order's preamble, like that in 
numerous statutes, propounded reasons why the president believed 
certain policies warranted adoption, while the directive proffered 
those "policies as rules of conduct to be followed" and instructed an 
executive branch officer to "promulgate additional rules and regula-
tions consistent with the policy" proclaimed and necessary to its im-
plementation.139 Black also stated that Congress certainly could have 
approved the policies enunciated in the Truman Administration order 
through legislative authority to "take private property for public use" 
as well as to pass statutes, which govern employee-employer relation-
ships, which prescribe rules to resolve labor-management disputes, 
and which fix working conditions and wages in particular segments of 
the nation's economy.140 The jurist emphatically admonished that the 
"Constitution (did] not subject this law making power of Congress to 
presidential or military supervision or control."141 
Black vociferously rejected appeals by the Truman Administra-
tion to previous practice of chief executives who, absent some 
authority which senators and representatives had granted, purport-
edly exercised presidential power and seized private business enter-
prises when settling employment controversies between labor and 
management.142 Regardless of whether the government had accu-
rately portrayed the relevant history, the Justice observed that Con-
gress could not cede its "exclusive constitutional authority to make 
laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers," which the United 
States Constitution vested in the federal government.143 Moreover, 
the jurist remarked that the Founders of the country entrusted Con-
gress alone with legislative authority in both good and bad times, 144 
while recounting the historical developments, the hopes for freedom 
and the fears of power which underlay the Framers' choices would 
only confirm the proposition that this seizure action must be invali-
138. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88. See also U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 1, 8, cl.18. 
139. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. He facetiously commented that the Truman Ad-
ministration Executive Order "directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner 
prescribed by the President." Id. 
140. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8; infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
141. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. See also infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. 
142. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. See also infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
143. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89. See also U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8, cl. 18. 
144. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. See also infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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In short, Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court majority, 
could discover no express or implicit statutory authority which might 
substantiate the Truman Administration's Executive Order seizing 
the steel companies. The jurist concomitantly ascertained that the 
United States Constitution did not accord the president explicit 
power to seize the corporations, while neither the official's authority 
as commander-in-chief of American armed forces nor the officer's 
executive power furnished implied support for the presidential initia-
tive. Black also described seizure as lawmaking, which the Constitu-
tion bestows exclusively on Congress. 
3. The Concurring Opinions in Youngstown 
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas and Burton all joined the 
opinion that Justice Black authored and, therefore, comprised a ma-
jority of the High Court, while Justice Clark concurred only in the 
judgment and wrote a separate decision. All four members who 
joined the opinion penned by Black authored their own concurrences. 
These Justices may have concurred for reasons similar to those which 
Justice Frankfurter so clearly espoused and which we examined 
above.146 
a. Justice Frankfurter's Opinion 
Justice Frankfurter prefaced his analysis with a disquisition on 
United States history, the tripartite branches of the federal govern-
ment, and the judiciary's appropriate role and obligation when it ad-
judicates disputes about the meaning of the American Constitution.147 
Frankfurter characterized a constitutional democracy as an excep-
145. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. See also TRIBE, supra note 7, at 671-73 (criticizing 
Black's approach to Congress' silence); Joseph Grundfest & A. C. Pritchard, Statutes With 
Multiple Personality Disorders, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002); infra text accompanying 
notes 203-04, 210. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994) (assessing silence); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION (1997). 
146. The method in which Justice Black applied separation of powers led him to join 
the majority opinion, but he found the principle more complex and flexible than it seemed 
and stated that varying views might have suggested different emphasis and nuance which 
one decision could not capture, thus requiring individual articulation to reach a common 
result. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also supra notes 
122-23 and accompanying text. 
147. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593. See also Neal K. Katya!, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Abner Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Re-
sponse to Professor Neal Katya/, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998); supra notes 107-10, 146 
and accompanying text; sources cited infra note 151. 
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tionally difficult social arrangement to administer with success in part 
because the form "implies the reign of reason on the most extensive 
scale."148 The jurist remarked that the Founders clearly recognized 
the need for limiting the power which the governors exercise over the 
individuals whom they govern; premised the central government's 
structure on checks and balances that would attain this objective; and 
considered the separation of powers principle to be a "felt neces-
sity. "149 Frankfurter claimed the Framers labored under no illusions 
about the hazards which concentrated authority presented, and the 
Justice perspicaciously warned that the "accretion of dangerous 
power does not come in a day [but] slowly from the generative force 
of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most 
disinterested assertion of authority. "150 
The jurist adamantly disavowed the notion that the judiciary 
could serve as an overseer for the United States government, while he 
observed that federal courts must rigorously abide by a circumscribed 
view of the judicial function in addressing constitutional disputes and 
even refrain from deciding those complicated, sensitive controversies 
whenever this approach proves intellectually defensible.151 After 
Frankfurter evinced profound reluctance about, but discerned no 
means to avoid, scrutiny of the powers and responsibilities which the 
other governmental branches exercise, the jurist proffered as the 
touchstone for resolving constitutional adjudication the famous pro-
nouncement from Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland that "it is a constitution we are expounding."152 Frankfurter 
considered advice proffered by the revered jurist especially apropos 
when the Supreme Court is applying the separation of powers doc-
trine which underlies the document, and Frankfurter invoked the ad-
monition from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that the principal or-
dinances in the Constitution "do not establish and divide fields of 
148. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593. See also infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
149. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593. See also infra notes 197-98, 202-04 and accompa-
nying text. 
150. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594. See also infra notes 167, 200-04 and accompanying 
text. 
151. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594-95. See also LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE 
(2001); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 311-464; Rachel Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The 
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 CO LUM. L. 
REV. 237 (2002); infra note 231. 
152. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 596 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original)). See generally JEANE. SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL 
(1996); Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217 
(1955); infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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black and white."153 
Justice Frankfurter carefully disclaimed any need for examining, 
much less reaching definitive conclusions about, the chief executive's 
authority in the absence of legislation which he found to implicate 
presidential power for seizing the steel mills.154 The Justice compre-
hensively surveyed relevant actions undertaken by members of Con-
gress and determined that lawmakers had authorized executive 
branch seizure on sixteen occasions over the preceding three and a 
half decades but had qualified every particular grant with limitations 
and safeguards.155 The jurist assessed what he described as the most 
recent, applicable legislative consideration of the issue; ascertained 
that senators and representatives forcefully and clearly withheld 
authority in 1947 by commanding the president to request explicit sei-
zure power, should the officer need it; and disavowed imposition of 
any requirement for negating the "authority in formal legislation," 
because Congress expressed the "will to withhold this power as 
though it had said so" specifically.156 Frankfurter analyzed subsequent 
legislative activity, as well as important later and contemporaneous 
developments, most notably, the Korean conflict. However, he con-
cluded that no authority had thereafter withdrawn the restriction in-
stituted or changed the congressional perspective enunciated in the 
1947 Labor Management Relations Act.157 
The Justice found inappropriate the notion of narrowly confining 
constitutional law to the precise terms which the Founders had incor-
porated in the fundamental document while disregarding the "gloss 
which life has written upon them."158 For example, Frankfurter ex-
153. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Springer v. 
Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 {1928) {Holmes, J., dissenting)); infra 
note 237 and accompanying text. 
154. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597 {Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Felix Frank-
furter, Reading of Statutes-Some Reflections, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1946); supra notes 
105-10, 129-30 and accompanying text. 
155. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597-98. See also supra notes 105-06, 108, 129-31 and ac-
companying text. 
156. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602. Justice Frankfurter trenchantly observed that "it 
would be not merely infelicitous draftsmanship but almost offensive gaucherie to write 
such a restriction upon the President's power in terms into a statute rather than to have it 
authoritatively expounded as it was, by controlling legislative history." Id., 343 U.S. at 
603. See also supra notes 106, 110, 132-33 and accompanying text. 
157. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603-10. Frankfurter observed that "to find authority so 
explicitly withheld is not merely to disregard in a particular instance the clear will of Con-
gress. It is to disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of 
authority between President and Congress." Id. at 609. 
158. Id. at 610. See also infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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pressed appreciation that a "systematic, executive practice, long pur-
sued" with Congress's knowledge and which lawmakers had left un-
questioned over a protracted time might warrant treatment as a 
"gloss on 'executive power' vested in the President" by Article II of 
the Constitution.159 Nevertheless, the jurist's thoroughgoing review of 
earlier circumstances when the federal government had seized private 
commercial instrumentalities revealed that senators and representa-
tives had not historically acquiesced to the exercise of executive 
authority.160 
Justice Frankfurter briefly reexamined the limitations that the 
Framers imposed upon the efficiency of a government with distrib-
uted power, which litigants can challenge in federal court.161 The ju-
rist contended that the Founders deemed the price acceptable in light 
of the valuable safeguards which the restrictions afforded and quoted 
Justice Louis Brandeis for this proposition.162 Frankfurter acknowl-
edged how unpleasant he considered finding that the Truman Ad-
ministration had exceeded its authority, especially when the President 
was animated by the crucial need to protect the country and to avert 
danger in a national crisis.163 However, the jurist trusted the patriot-
ism and wisdom of the executive and legislative branches would lead 
both institutions to reconcile their differences on issues which were 
overshadowed by momentous global events.164 
In short, Justice Frankfurter clearly recognized the critical neces-
sity for exercising judicial restraint, while he emphatically voiced 
grave doubts, premised on concerns related to .the Supreme Court's 
authority and legitimacy, about intervening in a dispute between the 
president and the members of Congress over separation of powers.165 
159. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11. See also infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
160. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 611-13. See also infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
161. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613. See also infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
162. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613-14. The Framers adopted separation of powers, "not 
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, 
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of 
the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." 
Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)). 
163. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614. See also infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
164. He invoked a similar "moment of utmost anxiety" when President George 
Washington sought the Court's advice which it could not give, while Frankfurter was 
heartened by the idea that Truman and Congress would continue to safeguard this heri-
tage derived directly from Washington. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614. 
165. We rely here on FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 
(1930); PHILIP KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); 
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Despite the substantial reluctance evidenced, the jurist felt compelled 
by his constitutional duty to declare that Truman lacked seizure 
authority. 
b. Justice Jackson's Opinion 
Justice Robert Jackson's concurrence, which Professor Sanford 
Levinson has characterized as the single most important opinion in 
the High Court's history, is principally renowned for the three-part 
analysis which the jurist devised for treating disagreements over po-
litical branch assertions of power.166 However, the opinion is also im-
portant because it exemplifies Jackson's consummate ability to differ-
entiate with clarity his role and perspective when serving as a 
Supreme Court Justice from his responsibilities and views as an ad-
viser in several capacities, namely Solicitor General and Attorney 
General, for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Democratic Ad-
ministration. For instance, Jackson warned that the question of a 
power's validity and the substantive policy which it is invoked to fos-
ter could be easily confused; that thorough, undefined presidential 
authority has pragmatic benefits and severe risks for the United 
States; and that undue emphasis on transient results may have en-
during ramifications for the balanced power structure that had bene-
fited the country so substantially for a century and a half.167 Moreo-
ver, the concurrence might be the most lucid, straightforward 
exposition on the remarkable dearth of very clear and useful legal 
authority which applies to concrete issues that involve executive 
power as the questions manifest themselves in practice.168 The Fram-
ers' intent must be divined from enigmatic sources, which 150 years of 
scholarly investigation and partisan debate had failed to illuminate,169 
JOSEPH LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1975); MELVIN UROFSKY, 
FELIX FRANKFURTER (1991); Frankfurter, supra note 154. 
166. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 63-39 (Jackson, J., concurring); Sanford Levinson, The 
Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE 
LAW 187, 202-04 (Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996). See also Katyal & Tribe, 
supra note 4, at 1285 (characterizing Jackson's analytical construct as "three now-
canonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation of powers"); Morton Ro-
senberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemak-
ing Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 199 (1981) (expressing prefer-
ence for Jackson's opinion over Black's). 
167. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also REHNQUIST, su-
pra note 2, at 2-20. 
168. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-39. See also infra note 233. 
169. The investigation and debate supply "more or less apt quotations from respected 
sources on" both sides of questions which "largely cancel each other." Youngstown, 343 
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while the Court's determinations are rather indecisive precisely be-
cause they address in the narrowest possible fashion the most pro-
found matters.110 
Jackson also declared that the pragmatic art of constitutional 
governance could not conform with judicial attempts to define the 
authority exercised by the three governmental branches, which derive 
from isolated clauses in the basic document or even specific Articles 
ripped from context.111 The jurist recognized that the "Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty," although the Founders 
also envisioned that actual experience would integrate dispersed 
authority into a workable government, each coordinate branch of 
which would be separate but interdependent and autonomous yet re-
ciprocal.112 He observed that presidential powers were "not fixed but 
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those 
of Congress."173 
Jackson introduced his three-pronged framework for assessment 
of federal governmental authority by describing the construct as a 
rather over-simplified categorization of practical instances in which 
the chief executive might doubt, or other observers could question, 
the president's power and by crudely differentiating the legal conse-
quences that this factor of relativity produced.174 The three classifica-
tions correspondingly delineate situations in which the chief execu-
tive's authority is greatest, least substantial and somewhere between 
those polar opposites. 
The Justice maintained that the president exercises the maximum 
power when proceeding with explicit or implied congressional ap-
proval, because the authority encompasses all of the power which the 
chief executive possesses and all of the authority which senators and 
representatives delegate to the officer.115 In this context, the president 
personifies the federal sovereignty, so that invalidation of a particular 
action which the official undertakes would mean that the "Federal 
Government as an undivided whole lacks power. "176 
U.S. at 635 (citation omitted). 
170. Id. See also supra note 151 and accompanying text; infra note 248 and accompa-
nying text. 
171. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. See also supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
172. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. 
173. Id. See generally Black, supra note 116, at 98-99. 
174. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also infra text accom-
panying note 233. 
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. 
176. Id. at 637. A presidential seizure executed under statute would receive the 
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Jackson characterized the second category as an intermediate 
area in which the chief executive proceeds without an express legisla-
tive grant or denial.177 The president can depend on the officer's own 
authority alone; however, the Justice described a "twilight zone" 
where the chief executive and Congress may possess concurrent 
power or the distribution of authority remains unclear.178 In these cir-
cumstances, therefore, legislative "inertia, indifference or acquies-
cence," as pragmatic matters, could occasionally permit, and even in-
vite, independent presidential initiatives.179 For the second grouping, 
he admonished that actual tests of power will probably reflect the 
"imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, [not] ab-
stract legal theories. "180 
The last classification includes presidential endeavors which con-
flict with explicit or implied congressional will. Jackson characterized 
the chief executive's authority as at its nadir, because the official can 
rely solely on the officer's express powers under the Constitution mi-
nus any relevant legislative branch authority.181 In this situation, 
judges must carefully scrutinize claims to power and should uphold 
exclusive presidential authority only if courts disable Congress from 
acting on specific matters.182 
Jackson then applied his three-part analytical framework to the 
Truman Administration's assertion of executive power for seizing the 
steel mills. The Justice promptly eliminated the claim from the initial 
category, because the United States government "conceded that no 
congressional authorization exists for this seizure."183 The jurist ex-
cluded the assertion with similar expedition from the second classifi-
cation, as lawmakers had not considered the seizure of industrial en-
strongest presumption and the "widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden 
of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Id. at 636-37. See also 
infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. 
177. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. See also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text, infra notes 245-46 and 
accompanying text. 
180. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. 
181. Id. See also infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text. 
182. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (citation omitted). A claim so conclusive and 
preclusive requires scrutiny, as the constitutional system's equilibrium is at stake. Id. at 
638. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller, 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(scrutinizing "war power"); Black, supra note 116, at 98. 
183. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638. This also would remove the support of many decla-
rations and precedents that were proffered in "relation, and must be confined to, this cate-
gory." Id. (citation omitted). 
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terprises an open question.184 He found senators and representatives 
had clearly intended to occupy the field through the prescription of 
several statutory procedures that prohibited the government from 
seizing and operating the steel companies, processes which the ad-
ministration had not invoked.185 Jackson vehemently rejected the no-
tion that congressional failure to legislate with particularity on private 
property seizures required or encouraged the chief executive's selec-
tion of a different, inconsistent approach.186 
The determinations reached above meant the presidential action 
must be supported exclusively under the third category's severe stric-
tures, which derive substantiation solely from the executive power 
remaining after subtraction of applicable congressional authority over 
the area.187 The Court could uphold the Truman Administration ef-
fort only by concluding that the seizure was within the chief execu-
tive's purview and beyond the legislative domain; therefore, judicial 
review proceeded under circumstances which left claims of presiden-
tial authority most susceptible to attack and in the least advantageous 
constitutional position.188 
Jackson declared that the Chief Executive does not possess pow-
ers which are unmentioned in the Constitution, but the jurist prom-
ised that he would give the President's enumerated authority in the 
basic document the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be 
"reasonable practical implications," instead of the rigidity which a 
doctrinaire textualism would dictate.189 The Justice concomitantly 
undertook a rather comprehensive review of the presidential power 
that the United States government asserted for seizing American 
steel corporations. 
Jackson commenced with an examination of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's reliance on three specific clauses which appear in the Executive 
Article. The jurist initially rejected the argument that the clause 
which vested executive authority in the president comprised a grant 
184. See id. at 639. See also supra notes 129-32, 154-57 and accompanying text. 
185. When supplying the government's needs, it may seize plants that do not comply 
with obligatory orders it placed or use eminent domain to condemn facilities. 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (citation omitted). The third situation is when the nation's 
general economy requires protection. Id. (citation omitted). 
186. Id. at 640. See also supra notes 156-57, infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
187. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640. See also supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
188. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640. See also supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
189. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640. He rejected a "niggardly construction" as some 
clauses could become nearly unworkable and immutable by indulging no "latitude of in-
terpretation for changing times." Id. 
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of very expansive executive power; Jackson considered it to allocate 
this office generic authority thereafter constitutionally prescribed and 
criticized the broad power Truman claimed by analogizing it to the 
"prerogatives exercised by George IIl."190 The Justice similarly ne-
gated the assertion premised on the commander-in-chief clause, be-
cause the president could effectuate an exponential increase in the of-
ficial's domination of domestic affairs by committing American 
armed forces to what the jurist described as international ventures.191 
Jackson, who assumed for the purposes of argument that the United 
States was at war, maintained the Constitution explicitly assigns Con-
gress principal responsibility to supply the nation's armed forces. 192 
The Justice countered governmental dependence on the "take care" 
clause in Article II by proffering the Fifth Amendment proscription 
which involves deprivations of "life, liberty and property without due 
process of law."193 The jurist found the prohibition demonstrated that 
the United States is a "government of laws, not of men [who submit] 
to rulers only if under rules."194 
Jackson disparaged the Solicitor General's attempt at premising 
the Truman Administration seizure upon "nebulous, inherent powers 
never expressly granted" but which ostensibly accrued to the office 
from the practices followed by numerous prior chief executives.195 
The jurist contended the loose and irresponsible employment of ad-
jectives colored much legal, and all non-legal, discourse about presi-
dential authority, while observers often use "interchangeably and 
without fixed or ascertainable meaning" inherent, implied, incidental, 
190. Id. at 640-41. See also infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
191. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (citation omitted). See also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 {1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (voicing analogous concerns in a 
similar context); supra notes 91, 134-36, infra notes 287, 296 and accompanying text. See 
generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
192. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, els. 12-14. He in-
dulged this power little latitude when "turned inward on a labor-industry economic strug-
gle." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645. 
193. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646; See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, amend. V; supra 
note 140 and accompanying text; infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
194. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 646. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 
163 (1803); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 282 (2001); William Van Alstyne, A 
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 4, at 
1289; infra note 291 and accompanying text. 
195. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646. Justice Jackson described the President's argument 
as a plea for power to treat a crisis according to its necessities, the unstated "assumption 
being that necessity knows no law." Id. 
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plenary, war and emergency powers.196 The Justice forcefully repudi-
ated the argument that the Supreme Court should discover inherent 
authority present for treating national crises, as the Framers had re-
fused to provide explicitly for these particular circumstances in the 
Constitution.197 He believed Congress might have afforded, yet de-
cided not to grant, the chief executive substantial emergency power; 
therefore, the High Court should refrain from recognizing this type of 
authority primarily because the notion lacks any beginning or end.198 
Jackson concluded with a dissertation on modern constitutional 
governance at the mid-twentieth century. The Justice determined 
that "vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by 
the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity;" that the 
contemporary chief executive could exert substantial "leverage upon 
those who are supposed to check and balance" the official's signifi-
cant authority, which frequently cancelled their effectiveness; and 
that the existing political party system in America exacerbated the 
circumstances delineated.199 These propositions led the jurist to ob-
serve that the Supreme Court must not further aggrandize the office 
of president, which he asserted was already so powerful and compara-
tively immune from judicial review, at Congress's expense.200 Jackson 
distilled the essence of free government - a concept that American 
constitutionalism "is fashioned to fulfill ... so far as humanly possi-
ble" - as government "by those impersonal forces which we call 
law."201 The Justice declared that the "Executive, except for recom-
mendation and veto, has no legislative power," that the challenged 
endeavor originated in the will of the president and constituted an 
"exercise of authority without law," and that the best technique for 
196. See id. at 646-47. Accord Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1981). 
See also John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and Resolu-
tion of a "Nonproblem:" Dames & Moore v. Regan, The Foreign Affairs Power, and the 
Role of the Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1129, 1155 (1981). 
197. One exception is the habeas corpus writ's suspension during rebellion or invasion. 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650. See also U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 9, cl. 2; supra notes 16-20 and 
accompanying text. 
198. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 653. See also infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. 
199. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653-54. For today's Office, see also Martin Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Abner Greene, Checks and Balances 
in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994). But see Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 716 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Pra-
kash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
200. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (citation omitted). See also supra note 167 and ac-
companying text. 
201. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654-55. See also supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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preserving free government was to have the executive under the sub-
stantive law, which parliamentary deliberations formulated.202 Finally, 
the jurist admonished that these venerable institutions, which had 
served the United States exceptionally well for such an extended pe-
riod "may be destined to pass away," but the High Court must be last, 
rather than first, to abandon them.203 
In short, Justice Jackson's concurrence enunciated a three-
pronged framework for evaluating power allocation between the chief 
executive and the Congress. That articulation of authority's distribu-
tion has become the touchstone which the Supreme Court and legal 
commentators have employed to assess separation of powers ques-
tions that have arisen since Youngstown's issuance. Presidential 
authority is greatest whenever the legislative branch explicitly 
authorizes an action and least when lawmakers expressly or implicitly 
disavow the effort, while there remains a twilight zone in which con-
current power exists or the distribution of authority is unclear. The 
Justice's application of this analytical regime to the steel seizure order 
prompted his conclusions that the power asserted by the chief execu-
tive was at its lowest ebb and that invalidation of the presidential ini-
tiative was appropriate. It is important to remember that Jackson had 
served as a prosecutor at Nuremberg and had been the Solicitor Gen-
eral and the Attorney General in the Justice Department during the 
Roosevelt Administration, which confronted several national emer-
gencies, namely the great depression and World War II. These expe-
riences made him, as a Justice, keenly aware of the need for swift, ef-
ficient governmental action and of the complex, subtle issues that 
implicated separation of powers. Moreover, Jackson was a rather 
conservative jurist, who was acutely sensitive to actions which might 
undermine the Supreme Court's authority and credibility, especially 
when resolving disputes over political branch power. Nevertheless, 
the Justice was required by constitutional oath and concerns about 
the breadth of claims respecting executive authority to rule that the 
President had overstepped his power.204 
202. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (no one would know the limits of the power sought 
to be asserted or the rights potentially infringed). See also supra note 137-140, 143-45 and 
accompanying text. 
203. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (citation omitted). See also supra notes 151-53 and 
accompanying text. 
204. Jackson voiced similar views in cases that involved analogous issues. See supra 
notes 182, 191, infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text. See also ROBERT JACKSON, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); ROBERT JACKSON, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (1955). 
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c. Justice Douglas' Opinion 
Justice Douglas employed modes of decisionmaking, and ex-
pressed sentiments, analogous to those in the opinions that we evalu-
ated above.205 The central themes in the Douglas concurrence, how-
ever, were that the branch of the Federal Government which 
possessed constitutional authority to act and the legislative nature of 
the Truman initiative.206 The Justice characterized the Executive Or-
der's purpose as "condemning property [and] a taking in the constitu-
tional sense," while he declared that Congress, the governmental 
branch which has the "power to pay compensation for a seizure is the 
only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the 
President had effected." 207 Moreover, Douglas strongly and clearly 
rejected the notion of sanctioning the Truman Administration's 
power assertion because the Supreme Court would enlarge and re-
write Article II for the current emergency's political conveniences 
and would cede the president legislative authority which the official 
simply did not have.208 The Justice concluded with the observation 
that the nation pays dearly for the scheme of checks and balances as 
well as separated powers among the three governmental branches, a 
price which might appear exorbitant.209 Nonetheless, the Jurist ad-
monished that the seizure mechanism's employment for what appar-
ently are the most pressing and benign ends at a given historical mo-
ment could be transformed into an instrument of oppression in the 
future. 210 
205. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). For example, he, like the 
opinions' authors stressed separation of powers and distinctions between legislative and 
executive authority as well as military affairs and civilian matters. Id. at 629-34. See also 
supra notes 134-36, 149, 191 and accompanying text. 
206. A decision to apply sanctions, to place the law's force on parties and to direct the 
Court's force against them "is an exercise of legislative power." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 
630 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
207. Id. at 631-32. The condemnation provision in the Fifth Amendment apparently 
dictated these propositions, which comported with the perspectives on checks and bal-
ances propounded in Justice Black's opinion for the majority. Id. at 632. See also supra 
notes 127-44, 193 and accompanying text. 
208. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 633 (Douglas J., concurring) (this "step would most as-
suredly alter the pattern of the Constitution" while rhetorically stating that future genera-
tions might "deem it so urgent that the President have legislative authority that the Consti-
tution will be amended"). 
209. Id. (an inherent risk is stalemates that allow crises to mount and the country to 
suffer when the "White House and Capitol Hill" do not cooperate). See also supra notes 
161-62 and accompanying text. 
210. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 633-34. His approach to legislative silence seems most 
sound. Espousal of an "underlying constitutional rule," which invalidated the seizure, ab-
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d. The Opinions of Justice Burton and Justice Clark 
We accord comparatively limited treatment to the concurring de-
cision of Justice Harold Burton211 and to the opinion of Justice Tom 
Clark, who concurred in the High Court's judgment but not in the 
Black opinion for the majority.212 Neither jurist enunciated particu-
larly new insights. For example, because lawmakers had authorized 
specific procedures for the chief executive and reserved the preroga-
tive to decide exactly when seizure might be appropriate, Justice Bur-
ton determined that the Truman Administration Executive Order 
"invaded the jurisdiction of Congress [and] violated the essence of the 
principle of the separation of governmental powers." 213 Justice Clark 
similarly found that presidential failure to follow the legislatively -
prescribed process required the Justice to invalidate the steel seizure 
order.214 
4. The Dissenting Opinion in Youngstown 
Chief Justice Fred Vinson, whom Justice Stanley Reed and Jus-
tice Sherman Minton joined, wrote a dissenting opinion in the 
Youngstown case.215 The three Supreme Court members dissented 
because the crucial litigation posed vitally important questions, which 
held transcendent significance for Truman's authority and for the 
power of future chief executives to address efficaciously crises that 
threaten the country.216 The determination by Chief Justice Vinson 
consumed a number of pages in the United States Reports, while he 
deployed assessment techniques, and reached conclusions, quite dif-
sent Congress' express prior consent, prevents the President from confronting it with a fait 
accompli. See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 672. See also WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT 
YEARS {1980); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES {1956). 
211. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring). See also REHNQUIST, supra 
note 2, at 182-83. 
212. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660 {Clark, J., concurring) (Clark, like Jackson, had 
served as U.S. Attorney General). See also infra note 222 {Clark, like Frankfurter, 
evinced regret about invalidating Truman's action). See also supra note 62 and accompa-
nying text. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 183. 
·213. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660. See also supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
214. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667. He invoked Justice Joseph Story's advice about ju-
dicial review of executive action: the Supreme Court must expound the laws as found in 
the records of state and "cannot, when called upon by the citizens of the country, refuse 
[its] opinion, however it may differ from that of very great authorities." Id. at 666-67 
(citing The Orono, 18 Fed. Cas. No.10, 585 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)). 
215. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 {Vinson, C. J., dissenting). See generally MARCUS, 
supra note 2. 
216. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667. The dissent also found that no ground could sup-
port affirmance. 
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ferent from those of his colleagues who were in the majority. Never-
theless, we accord comparatively limited treatment to the dissenting 
opinion principally because this decision has not withstood the test of 
time. 
Chief Justice Vinson initially evaluated the particular factual 
context in which President Truman sought to exercise his authority. 
The jurist admonished observers who found the situation to implicate 
an exceptional assertion of power that the chief executive was respon-
sible for governing in an extraordinary period.211 Vinson thoroughly 
canvassed the relevant developments which had preceded the 
Truman Administration's decision to promulgate the order and dis-
covered no basis for questioning the president's determination of an 
emergency .218 
The jurist then consulted the executive authority granted by the 
Constitution and stated that the Framers "deliberately fashioned [the 
Presidency] as an office of power and independence. "219 The Chief 
Justice accused those who challenged the Executive Order's validity 
of seeking to amend the Constitution and claimed that Supreme 
Court expansion of the fundamental document was unnecessary be-
cause "history and time-honored principles of constitutional law" 
supported the Truman Administration seizure.220 Vinson comprehen-
sively reviewed the plethora of previous occasions on which presi-
dents had addressed national emergencies by acting resolutely and 
expeditiously to enforce legislative programs or to save congressional 
projects until senators and representatives could respond.221 He con-
tended that this historical survey of executive initiatives could easily 
sustain the order seizing the steel mills.222 
The Chief Justice next carefully scrutinized the efforts instituted 
by President Truman and found the official had taken care that the 
laws were faithfully executed; in particular, the President had fully in-
formed legislators that the officer's endeavors were meant to preserve 
217. Id. at 668. See generally THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 372 (1914); 
WILLIAM How ARD T AFf, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139-40 (1925). 
218. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668-78 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
219. Id. at 682. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). But see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 & 48, at 301, 308 (James 
Madison). 
220. See Youngstown, 343 U.S at 683. 
221. See id. at 683-700. 
222. Id. at 700. Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Clark advised President Truman that 
he possessed sufficient authority to seize the steel mills. See DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, 
TRUMAN 896-97 (1992). 
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their prerogatives and not to defy congressional will.223 Vinson saw 
little reason for fearing dictatorship or executive tyranny when the 
President faithfully implements the laws and maintains the status quo, 
until lawmakers have sufficient opportunities to consider and adopt 
appropriate responses.224 
The dissenters concluded that judicial, legislative and executive 
branch precedents demonstrated President Truman had thoroughly 
complied with his responsibilities under the Constitution.225 The three 
justices determined the chief executive had promptly notified sena-
tors and representatives of the initiative undertaken and had clearly 
stated his intention to honor lawmakers' prerogatives, while the dis-
sent declared that "[n]o basis for claims of arbitrary action, unlimited 
powers or dictatorial usurpation of congressional power appears from 
the facts of this case. "226 
D. The Meaning Subsequently Accorded Youngstown 
The Supreme Court has rather infrequently relied upon Justice 
Hugo Black's opinion for the majority in Youngstown over the ensu-
ing half century. To be sure, on some occasions, the High Court or 
individual members have invoked the Black determination principally 
for ideas respecting separation of powers.221 However, the Supreme 
223. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701-04. 
224. Id. at 704. 
225. Id. at 710. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 135-36, 147-48, 183-84. 
226. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 710. See also supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
Truman reflected: 
Whatever the six justices [] meant by their differing opinions about the constitu-
tional powers of the President, he must always act in a national emergency .... 
We live in an age when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic 
notes. There are no longer sharp distinctions between combatants and noncom-
batants, between military targets and the sanctuary of civilian areas. Nor can we 
separate the economic facts from the problems of defense and security. [The] 
President, who is Commander in Chief and who represents the interest of all the 
people, must be able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat to the nation's 
security. 
HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 478 (1956). For 
Youngstown's contemporary analysis, see Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A 
Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 {1953); Paul Kauper, The Steel Sei-
zure Case: Congress, The President And The Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141 (1952). 
227. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731, 740 {1971) (White, J., 
concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-29 (1958). See also United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Adminis-
trative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 972 (2001) (stating that 
lower federal courts have applied Youngstown to declare illegal actions directed by execu-
tive orders which Presidents Bush and Bill Clinton issued). See generally MARCUS, supra 
note 2, at 228-48. 
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Court has more often applied the concurrence by Justice Robert 
Jackson primarily for the three-part analytical framework, which the 
jurist constructed to resolve interbranch disputes between the presi-
dent and Congress. The phenomenon's quintessential example, and 
perhaps the most valuable illustration of subsequent High Court de-
pendence on Youngstown in a rather closely-related context, is the 
opinion written by Justice William H. Rehnquist when resolving the 
1981 case of Dames & Moore v. Regan.228 This decision has assumed 
peculiar importance for several reasons. First, its author not only in-
voked the Jackson concurrence but also instructively explained, and 
expanded on, the framework for evaluation propounded. Moreover, 
Justice Rehnquist served as a judicial law clerk for Justice Jackson 
during the October 1951 Term when the Supreme Court issued 
Youngstown.229 Furthermore, Rehnquist became Chief Justice of the 
United States a half decade after penning the determination in Dames 
& Moore, and the jurist will probably preside over the High Court 
that would resolve challenges to the November 13 Executive Order. 
In the Dames & Moore v. Regan case, petitioners attacked Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter's order which nullified certain attachments of Ira-
nian property, required that individuals who held blocked Iranian se-
curities and funds transfer those assets to the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank and eventually Iran, as well as suspended pending 
claims against Iran and relegated litigants which pursued them to an 
international claims tribunal; the chief executive proffered five differ-
ent sources of explicit and implied power as support for the initia-
tive.230 Justice Rehnquist initially remarked that the parties and the 
lower federal courts in the Dames & Moore lawsuit all denominated 
the Youngstown opinion as the source of considerable applicable 
analysis.231 The jurist briefly alluded to the decision written for the 
Court by Justice Black, which recognized that the chief executive's 
authority, if any relevant power existed, must derive from a federal 
228. 435 U.S. 654 (1981). See generally Symposium, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 29 
UCLA L. REV. 977-1159 (1982); KOH, supra note 112, at 138-43, 197-98. 
229. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 2-20; Arthur S. Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A 
Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1104, 1109 n.27 (1981); Nowak & 
Rotunda, supra note 196, at 1156. 
230. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See generally Nowak & Rotunda, supra 
note 196. 
231. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (invoking the proposition about the federal judi-
ciary as the nation's "overseer" propounded by Justice Frankfurter, supra note 151 and 
accompanying text). 
422 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:3 
statute or from the United States Constitution.232 
Rehnquist then observed that the concurring determination 
authored by Justice Jackson had expounded in a comparatively gen-
eralized manner the "consequences of different types of interaction 
between the two democratic branches in assessing Presidential 
authority to act in any given case."233 Justice Rehnquist afforded a lu-
cid, succinct rendition of Jackson's three-pronged framework, while 
the jurist quoted extensively from the concurrence which Jackson 
f d . y 234 era te m oungstown. 
Justice Rehnquist remarked that the Supreme Court had on ear-
lier occasions, and in Dames & Moore, considered analytically helpful 
Jackson's organizational schematic, which parsed executive initiatives 
into three general classifications.235 Nevertheless, Rehnquist stated 
that even Jackson characterized those categories as "a somewhat 
oversimplified grouping,"236 while Rehnquist reminded his colleagues 
of the Holmesian admonition, which Justice Frankfurter had repro-
duced in the jurist's Youngstown concurrence.237 Justice Rehnquist, 
accordingly, instructed that any individual presidential action ranges 
somewhere along a broad spectrum from explicit congressional 
authorization to express legislative proscription, rather than fits 
"neatly in one of three pigeonholes," especially when the chief execu-
tive is treating international emergencies which the members of Con-
gress could not have anticipated.238 
Having proffered this informative explication and elaboration of 
Jackson's triadic formulation that addresses interbranch disputes 
which implicate power, Justice Rehnquist ultimately relied on the 
analytical construct in essence as articulated by the Youngstown con-
currence to resolve the contested question of presidential authority 
232. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668. See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. See 
generally supra notes 128-45 and accompanying text. 
233. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668. See also id. at 660 (invoking several important 
historical propositions propounded by Justice Jackson, supra notes 169-170 and accompa-
nying text). 
234. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-669. See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
235. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See also supra notes 174-87 and accompanying 
text. 
236. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). See generally supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
237. Justice Holmes observed that the Constitution's great ordinances do not "estab-
lish and divide fields of black and white." Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See also su-
pra note 153 and accompanying text. 
238. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. 
Spring 2002] YOUNGSTOWN REVISITED 423 
presented.239 Because Rehnquist ascertained that Carter had acted 
with explicit legislative approval when the chief executive promul-
gated the order which nullified attachments and transferred assets, 
the jurist accorded the endeavors the strongest presumptions and 
broadest latitude of judicial construction while litigants that chal-
lenged these efforts assumed a substantial burden of persuasion.240 
When Rehnquist applied the strict tests which he had gleaned from 
Jackson's first category, the jurist observed that the petitioners had 
not satisfied the formidable requirements delineated, and a contrary 
determination would have meant the "Federal Government as a 
whole lacked the power exercised by the President," a perspective 
which the members of the Court refused to countenance.241 
Justice Rehnquist also acknowledged that chief executives' initia-
tives which eliminated federal court jurisdiction to resolve cases and 
controversies in contravention of Article III or congressional legisla-
tion would be invalid.242 However, the jurist found the Carter Ad-
ministration order did "not divest the federal court of 'jurisdiction"' 
but only purported "to 'suspend' the claims"243 and, therefore, the 
situation exemplified the "difference between modifying federal-
court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a different rule of 
law."244 Rehnquist concomitantly asserted that the President had ex-
ercised authority, "acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims and [, 
thus,] simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the 
lawsuit,"245 while the jurist considered several enactments as suggest-
ing indirect legislative "acceptance of a broad scope for executive ac-
tion in circumstances such as those presented in this case. "246 
239. See id. at 674. See also supra notes 174-88 and accompanying text. 
240. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jack-
son, J., concurring)). See also Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 196, at 1156; supra notes 
175-76 and accompanying text. 
241. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (Jack-
son, J ., concurring)). See also supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
242. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684. See also Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 196, at 
1158. 
243. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684. 
244. Id. at 685 (citation omitted). 
245. Id. at 685. He analogized this acquiescence to, and cited, ideas in Frankfurter's 
Youngstown opinion. Id. at 686. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 252; su-
pra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. 
246. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. He avoided admitting the holding would allow 
the president to present Congress with the type of fait accompli implicitly rejected by 
Youngstown, but the results can be reconciled by not treating the transferred claims as 
"takings." TRIBE, supra note 7, at 675. Other 20th century foreign affairs cases have also 
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In sum, the Supreme Court has generally followed the approach 
which the majority espoused in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer and has not relied on the dissent, while the High Court has 
more frequently invoked Justice Jackson's concurrence than the 
opinions of Justice Black or the other members who concurred. We 
consider Dames & Moore v. Regan to be the most relevant 
Youngstown progeny, while Justice Rehnquist developed, but did not 
employ, a useful gloss on the Jackson three-part framework when re-
solving the dispute. Dames & Moore appears in tension with 
Youngstown, particularly to the extent the earlier decision concludes 
the applicable legislative activity might require that Congress ex-
pressly authorize presidential initiatives; however, these dimensions 
of the cases can be reconciled.247 Moreover, Dames & Moore war-
rants a narrow reading, as Justice Rehnquist carefully admonished,248 
while the unique situation presented by the critical need to secure 
release of the hostages held in Iran confines and explains the deter-
mination. The fourth section applies Youngstown to the Bush Order. 
IV. Why the Bush Order Fails the Youngstown Test 
This part of the article scrutinizes the Bush Administration Ex-
ecutive Order in light of the analytical framework enunciated by 
Youngstown, considering Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme 
Court, the separate decisions which the concurring Justices wrote, 
and the subsequent Dames & Moore case. We conclude that the 
Bush Order fails the Youngstown test, at least insofar as the directive 
purportedly authorizes indefinite detention of non-citizens and denies 
covered individuals federal court access. 
Our treatment begins with a restatement of the Youngstown de-
termination's controlling rationale, derived from synthesizing the 
various opinions penned by the six Justices who concurred in the sub-
stantive result. We then apply the approach to the Executive Order, 
exploring the directive's provisions, which govern the detention of 
suspected terrorists and federal court jurisdiction, in the context of 
how Congress expressed its will on those subjects both before and af-
not required presidents to have Congress' express approval. Id. at 675-76. 
247. See supra note 246. See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2320 (2001) (applying Youngstown to the modern administrative 
state); Percival, supra note 227 (same). 
248. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 ("We attempt to lay down no general 'guide-
lines' covering other situations [and] to confine the opinion only to the very questions nec-
essary to decision of the case."). 
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ter President Bush promulgated the order on November 13, 2001. 
The section also examines and rejects the claim that the Constitution 
grants the Chief Executive the authority to detain suspects and pre-
scribe jurisdiction, even when presidential actions contravene appar-
ent legislative will. The part next assesses the order's provisions 
through the separate Youngstown decisions authored by Justices 
Frankfurter, Jackson and Douglas, to the extent the concurrences 
might employ evaluative methods distinct from our synthesis of what 
Youngstown held. 
A. Youngstown's Analytical Framework 
We acknowledged above that the precise holding in Youngstown 
resists felicitous delineation, principally because there are numerous 
and somewhat diverse concurring opinions. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to articulate a fair, clear, synthetic approach to Justice Black's de-
termination for the Court and the decisions that the concurring Jus-
tices wrote. Our study of the Truman Administration steel seizure 
order; the directive's historical, and especially its legislative, milieu; 
the opinions of the six Justices who found the order unconstitutional; 
and subsequent judicial and academic commentary related to the de-
termination suggest that Youngstown's essential meaning can be 
enunciated in terms of five fundamental propositions. 
First, when a court analyzes whether an executive order com-
prises executive branch lawmaking that violates the Constitution, the 
court should determine whether the challenged directive furthers 
congressional will. Second, when ascertaining legislative will on a 
particular subject, the court should assess strong indicia of this will, 
such as recent congressional denials of executive branch requests for 
legislation, and is not restricted to the language of enacted statutes. 
Third, if the court decides that the executive order comports with the 
lawmakers' will on the specific issue, it ought to deem the directive a 
valid exercise of the executive power granted the president by Article 
II, so long as the matter is one for which the Constitution prescribes 
any federal authority. Fourth, should the court determine that the 
executive order violates congressional will, expressed in a passed 
statute or implied from prior legislative refusal to enact laws, the 
court will sustain the order only if the subject is one which Article II 
of the Constitution commits to the president, acting alone.249 Fifth, 
when considering whether Article II delegates a matter solely to the 
249. See supra notes 181-82, 187-88 and accompanying text. 
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chief executive, the court should evaluate claims that the document 
does so in light of constitutional text and history which support the 
contrary conclusion - that Article I or any relevant Amendments as-
sign Congress legislative powers over the subject. 
B. Applying this Framework to the Bush Order 
Application of this framework for analysis to the provisions of 
the Bush Order that authorize indefinite detention and preclude any 
federal judicial review of actions taken under the Order compels the 
conclusion that these provisions are unconstitutional. First, if a court 
applied our initial two propositions, it would find that the provisions 
contravene recent expressions of congressional will on both topics. 
As explained above, in the weeks following the September 11 terror-
ist attacks, the Bush Administration sought legislation that would 
authorize the indefinite detention of non-citizens certified by the At-
torney General to be suspected of international terrorism.250 This re-
quest provoked vigorous opposition voiced by senators and represen-
tatives in each political party.251 The Bush Administration first 
insisted that it never intended the apparent meaning of the draft bill 
the Administration had tendered to Congress, then resubmitted sub-
stantially the same language, and finally acquiesced in the phrasing of 
Senate Bill 1510, which limited non-citizen detentions to seven days, 
absent the filing of criminal charges or the initiation of deportation 
proceedings.252 Legislators also assiduously preserved meaningful 
federal judicial scrutiny of "any action or decision relating to this sec-
tion[,] including judicial review of the merits of" the Attorney Gen-
eral's certification that the officer had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing the non-citizen was a terrorist or otherwise a national security 
threat.253 
Congress' decision to preserve judicial review of non-citizen de-
tentions alone would sufficiently evidence the importance which 
lawmakers accorded federal court oversight of executive branch ac-
tions to support an inference that legislators would have also rejected 
the Bush Order's language which proscribed judicial review alto-
250. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. One way that Congress ensured federal 
judicial review would be a realistic option for non-citizen detainees was to reject the Ad-
ministration's request that detainees file petitions for habeas corpus in the District of Co-
lumbia federal courts. See also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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gether. It bears emphasis that the Administration never proffered a 
proposal which would have prevented any person whom the directive 
covered from seeking federal judicial review, to Senate and House 
members but rather asserted the notion for the first time in the Ex-
ecutive Order. There, in fact, is an additional, perhaps clearer, indica-
tion that Congress would not enact a statute that so limits federal 
courts access. The bill that Senate Judiciary Chair Leahy introduced 
explicitly required that any non-citizen subjected to trial in a military 
commission be granted an appeal as of right to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Services, with an opportunity for 
further review in the United States Supreme Court by petition for a 
writ of certiorari.254 
Insofar as this legislative history differs from the one the 
Youngstown majority and concurring opinions considered to evidence 
congressional disapproval of Truman's steel industry seizure, we be-
lieve the developments which transpired in fall 2001 and winter 2002 
even more forcefully demonstrate that the Bush Order violates the 
legislative will, especially in terms of contemporaneity and clarity. 
The Youngstown Court primarily relied upon a prior Congress' rejec-
tion of an executive branch request for seizure authority five years 
before the crisis that precipitated the Truman Order and three years 
before the United States entered the Korean conflict. During Sep-
tember 2001, however, the Bush Administration approached law-
makers in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, when 
the circumstances that ostensibly justified the extreme measures 
sought were clear to legislators and the American public. Even so, 
senators and representatives, aware of the extant dangers and risking 
political opprobrium,255 flatly rejected the Bush Administration's re-
quest for the power to detain non-citizens indefinitely and vehe-
mently resisted efforts to circumscribe federal judicial review of the 
limited detention authority granted.256 The Bush Order concomitantly 
prompted clear, sharp challenges from congressional leaders, a series 
of Senate Judiciary Committee hearings that documented constitu-
tional objections to the directive, and proposed legislation, introduced 
independently in both houses of Congress, which sought to control 
executive branch deployment of the military tribunals that the Order 
instituted. In contrast, Truman's request for legislative ratification of 
254. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text. 
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his steel seizure order elicited no congressional response.257 The re-
cent record is as powerful as, if not stronger than, the developments 
which supported the Youngstown majority's conclusion that the 
Truman Order contravened lawmakers' will. 
Second, a court applying our recommended framework for as-
sessment would then consider proposition four, because the third 
proposition is irrelevant to executive orders which conflict with legis-
lative will. The only grant of constitutional authority even arguably 
applicable to the Bush Order, and the sole one that the directive in-
vokes, is in Article II, which designates the president as "commander-
in-chief" of the United States armed forces. 258 Truman similarly 
placed great reliance on this power when substantiating his steel sei-
zure order.259 Integral to the Youngstown Court's finding that the 
Truman Order exceeded the president's commander-in-chief author-
ity was its conclusion, which our fifth proposition reflects: constitu-
tional text and history revealed Congress, not the president, was the 
political branch of the federal government accorded primary respon-
sibility to take domestic private property when the public good re-
quired it. In reaching this determination, the Justices relied upon the 
Constitution's delegation of the lawmaking power to Congress,260 the 
document's assignment of the principal role for supplying the armed 
forces to the legislative branch,261 the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
on the deprivation of "property without due process of law,"262 and 
the requirement for "just compensation" to be paid the owners of 
private property taken for the public good.263 
The Youngstown precedent also compels the conclusion that the 
provisions of the Bush Order which we have identified as constitu-
tionally suspect do, indeed, overstep the authority of the president 
when acting as commander-in-chief. Constitutional language and his-
tory demonstrate that Congress, rather than the president, is the po-
litical branch entrusted with the prescription of federal court jurisdic-
257. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
258. See Bush Order, supra note 3. 
259. See supra notes 1, 113, 134-36, 191-92 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 128-45 and accompanying text (discussing Black's opinion for the 
Court in Youngstown). See also supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra notes 166-204 and accompanying text (discussing Jackson's Youngstown 
concurrence). 
262. See id. See also supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (discussing Douglas's Youngstown 
concurrence). 
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tion.264 Article III expressly delegates lawmakers the power for mak-
ing "Exceptions" to the appellate jurisdiction of the United States 
Supreme Court.265 Moreover, the High Court has lopg construed the 
Article I and III provisions that authorize Congress to ordain and es-
tablish "from time to time" such "inferior Courts"266 as it deems ap-
propriate to grant legislators the lesser power to create lower federal 
courts of limited jurisdiction.267 Thus, the Bush Order's provisions 
which authorize indefinite detention of non-citizens, thereby pre-
cluding relief that might otherwise be available through the habeas 
corpus writ, and which expressly eliminate federal court power to 
hear claims pursued by or on behalf of those individuals who are 
subject to the Order, even more substantially invade the constitu-
tional province of Congress than did President Truman's steel seizure 
initiative. Hence, we conclude that these provisions in the Bush Or-
der violate the Constitution. 
1. Applying the Separate Concurring Opinions to the Bush Order 
We believe that our synthetic approach to Justice Black's opin-
ion for the Court and the decisions of the other five Justices who held 
the Truman Administration Executive Order unconstitutional is a 
fair, clear reading of Youngstown. This interpretation has withstood 
exacting scrutiny over the last fifty years. Yet, even if a court es-
chewed our evaluative framework, President Bush's recent assertion 
of authority would not satisfy the various ratio decidendi of the re-
maining Justices who concurred. 
The Jackson concurrence is most important in assessing the Bush 
Order, partly because of its frequent, subsequent invocation, espe-
cially then-Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the decision in Dames & 
Moore.268 Application of the Jackson concurring opinion to the Bush 
Order's provisions that mandate indefinite detention and proscribe 
264. See supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text (discussing Article III provisions 
and Supreme Court caselaw establishing Congress' role in creating the federal courts and 
delineating their respective jurisdictions). 
265. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See also supra notes 20-33 and accompanying 
text {discussing relevant caselaw interpreting this provision). 
266. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (e~powering 
Congress "To constitute (t]ribunals inferior to the supreme Court"). See generally supra 
notes 34-42 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text {discussing relevant caselaw). 
268. See supra notes 166-70, 228-46 and accompanying text (discussing the enduring 
significance of Justice Jackson's concurrence and the determination's relevance to the 
Dames & Moore case). 
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any federal judicial intervention would yield the conclusion that they 
are unconstitutional. For the previously-discussed reasons, which 
show those provisos contravene legislative will,269 Justice Jackson 
would have situated the provisions within his third category, when 
executive power is at its nadir. Jackson's Youngstown concurrence 
also teaches that the federal courts must rigorously scrutinize presi-
dential claims of authority within this classification, and impose sub-
stantial burdens on parties which proffer the assertions and uphold 
the power only if the Constitution disables Congress from acting on 
the matters.210 Justice Jackson would probably have concluded that 
the Bush Order's questionable provisos could not satisfy these strin-
gent tests, in particular because the Constitution explicitly assigns 
lawmakers the power and the responsibility for prescribing federal 
judicial jurisdiction.211 
The decision that Justice Rehnquist authored in Dames & Moore 
would have similar applicability to the Bush Order. Even if a court 
viewed the President's assertions of authority for detaining indefi-
nitely non-citizen suspects and for proscribing federal judicial jurisdic-
tion along the spectrum developed by the Rehnquist gloss on the 
Jackson concurring determination, rather than as within one of Jack-
son's three discrete groupings, the claims would be considerably 
nearer an express legislative prohibition than an explicit congres-
sional authorization.272 
Application of the remaining Youngstown concurrences would 
yield analogous results. Nonetheless, we accord those opinions com-
paratively limited treatment here, as the decisions have less relevance 
for the issues that the Bush Order raised, partly due to their some-
what infrequent citation and to the passage of time. For example, 
Justice Felix Frankfurter's firm conclusion that Congress had with-
held seizure power from President Truman273 strongly suggests the ju-
rist would find lawmakers had not granted President Bush authority 
for detaining non-citizen suspects indefinitely and for suspending all 
269. See supra notes 57-105 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 166-204 and accompanying text (analyzing Jackson's Youngstown 
concurrence). 
271. Sqpra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
272. Again, the reasons we give above for finding that the Bush Order's relevant pro-
visions conflict with congressional will, see supra notes 57-105 and accompanying text, 
support characterization of those provisions as nearing the express-congressional-
proscription end of Justice Rehnquist's spectrum of presidential power. 
273. See supra notes 148-65 and accompanying text (discussing Frankfurter's 
Youngstown concurrence). 
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judicial review of actions taken under the Order, even in the absence 
of a specific legislative enactment. Just as Justice William 0. Douglas 
determined that the governmental branch with the "power to pay 
compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure 
or make lawful one that the President has effected,"274 he would simi-
larly conclude that the Constitution's commitment to Congress of the 
power for establishing the federal judiciary and prescribing its juris-
diction excluded unilateral presidential abrogation of federal court 
jurisdiction that lawmakers had statutorily granted.275 
In sum, under either our proffered synthesis of the various 
Youngstown opinions or the analytical techniques applied in the sepa-
rate concurrences, the Bush Administration Executive Order does 
not pass constitutional muster, to the extent the directive purportedly 
authorizes the indefinite detention of non-citizens and proscribes the 
exercise of federal judicial jurisdiction provided by legislation. We 
appreciate that some readers could misunderstand our conclusions, 
because the constitutional questions which the Bush Order presents 
and application of the Youngstown precedent to these issues are si-
multaneously complex and subtle. Thus, the article's final section at-
tempts to anticipate numerous, possible ways that observers might 
improperly construe the views we espouse, to clarify those perspec-
tives, and to identify the broader, enduring ramifications of the admit-
tedly narrow claims that our arguments support. 
V. Limiting Clarifications and Broader Implications 
A. What we do not Contend 
This part emphasizes the narrowness of the determinations that 
we have reached by applying Youngstown to the Bush Order. Our 
focus has been the provisions that ostensibly permit indefinite deten-
tion and preclude federal judicial relief. Therefore, we proffered no 
assertions regarding other aspects of the directive. More specifically, 
the analysis provided does not require the conclusion that the Chief 
Executive lacked power to promulgate the Order's important provi-
sions authorizing military tribunals to try alleged war crimes which 
274. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 631-32 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
275. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (arguing that the Constitution's 
delegation to Congress of the duty to create and limit federal court jurisdiction required 
the conclusion that this same authority was not also within the President's power as com-
mander-in-chief). The ideas that we examined above would similarly apply to Justices 
Harold Burton and Tom Clark. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. 
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specific individuals responsible for the September 11 attacks commit-
ted. Our article acknowledges the strength of claims that submitting 
the trial of persons accused with war crimes to military commissions 
invokes a tradition of earlier presidents, who exercised their constitu-
tional power as commanders-in-chief,276 and that Congress has pre-
served this conventional executive prerogative by statute.277 In light 
of these contentions, we assume for the purposes of argument that the 
President may create military tribunals without express legislative 
authorization, a contested issue on which our paper expresses no 
opinion.278 
Despite the concerns surveyed, the Bush Order's additional as-
sertions of power to detain suspects indefinitely, whether or not they 
are tried, and to prohibit all judicial review of the directive or any ac-
tions implemented under it merit separate constitutional scrutiny. 
Indeed, for the reasons articulated in section four, we believe that the 
Order's provisions, which allow unlimited detention of non-citizens 
and nullify federal court jurisdiction granted by statute, unconstitu-
tionally intrude upon legislative authority delegated to Congress. It 
bears reiteration that our firm conviction respecting invalidity en-
compasses only the most extreme provisions included in the directive. 
We similarly underscore that the argument which challenges the 
constitutionality of the Bush Order's jurisdiction-stripping provision279 
preserves only that federal court jurisdiction and those rights and 
remedies which federal law otherwise affords, whatever their extent. 
Our article leaves unresolved potentially salient questions about the 
276. See, e.g., ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 2-6; Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 250-52. See generally WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 351-69 (3d ed., rev. 1914); David J. Bederman, Article 
II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825 (1993); Paust, supra note 10. 
277. See ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATION, supra note 14, at 2-6. See also Bush 
Order, supra note 3 (citing Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 21, codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 821, as authority for the Order); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 253; 
Dinh, supra note 19, at 405; Feldman, supra note 19, at 471-72. 
278. Compare George Lardner Jr., Democrats Blast Order on Tribunals; Senators Told 
Military Trials Fall Under President's Power, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A22 (report-
ing Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff's testimony that President Bush had 
power to authorize trial by military commissions absent congressional action or approval), 
with 148 CONG. REC. S741 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Military 
tribunals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but only if they are backed by 
specific congressional authorization.") (emphasis added); Katya! & Tribe, supra note 4, at 
1388-93 (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 821 does not supply authority for the Bush Order), and 
Paust, supra note 10, at 9 (same). See also U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 9 (empowering Con-
gress "To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"). 
279. See Bush Order,supra note 3, § 7(b). 
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availability, under existing statutes, of the habeas corpus writ to par-
ticular individuals detained outside of United States territory.280 We 
do not address whether persons who are subject to the Bush Order 
and can somehow invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court might 
have meritorious substantive claims for relief from any or all of the 
directive's provisions or from specific actions that the Administration 
institutes under the Order. The issues receive no treatment here prin-
cipally because they are beyond this paper's scope and partly because 
predicting which of myriad factual scenarios will actually arise and be 
litigated is difficult. In short, the article shows merely that the provi-
sion in the Bush Order which attempts to eliminate federal court ju-
risdiction is an invalid usurpation of congressional power. 
Our research finds that the Constitution authorizes the legislative 
branch, rather than the Chief Executive, to prescribe the federal judi-
ciary's jurisdiction, and that the Constitution imposes limitations on 
the power granted. It may well be that lawmakers can no more sup-
plant federal court jurisdiction by statute than President Bush is able 
to attain a similar result through executive order. Even if Congress 
ratified the Bush directive's provisions that deprive federal courts of 
jurisdiction and indefinitely detain non-citizens, the legislation 
adopted would raise serious constitutional doubts, although this 
sharply-contested, intractable question also exceeds the paper's com-
pass.281 In any event, our contention here is simply that those provisos 
in the Bush Order violate the Constitution because they exceed the 
Chief Executive's authority when acting alone. 
Finally, we do not question the good faith of President Bush or 
other executive branch officials, challenge the need for an efficacious 
response to terrorism, or minimize the grievous losses inflicted in the 
terrorist attacks or in subsequent efforts implemented when combat-
ing terrorism. The Bush Administration acted out of understandable, 
laudatory concerns about treating in the strongest feasible manner 
the horrific terrorist strikes and the continuing threat of attacks. 
Nonetheless, as Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence admon-
ished, the United States must resist "the infirmity of confusing the is-
sue of a power's validity with the cause it is invoked to promote."282 
280. See supra note 10 (discussing issues raised, but not resolved, in the Eisentrager 
litigation). 
281. See Katya) & Tribe, supra note 4, at 1334-35 {identifying serious Due Process con-
cerns raised by Order's denial of appeal right to an entity independent of executive). 
Cf supra note 33 (citing cases and commentary concerning constitutional limits on Con-
gress' power to restrict federal court jurisdiction). 
282. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also id. at 594 {Frank-
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1. Broader Implications of the Bush Order 
Justice Jackson concomitantly warned of the strong "tendency [] 
to emphasize transient results upon policies ... and lose sight of en-
during consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Re-
public. "283 The subpart above stressed the narrow character of the de-
terminations proffered. We also acknowledged that a federal court 
could well find future litigation contesting the Bush Order warrants 
dismissal based upon a jurisdictional defect wholly independent of the 
directive's jurisdiction-stripping provision or might address the merits 
and consider the administration's commitment of war crimes (among 
other) allegations to military tribunals to be a valid application of the 
President's commander-in-chief power. Because our conclusion is 
limited in nature, some readers may question its significance. We be-
lieve, however, the present assertion of executive authority to detain 
non-citizens indefinitely and to suspend the exercise of federal judi-
cial jurisdiction threatens "the balanced power structure of our Re-
public" with "enduring" harm. 
If President Bush possesses the power for eliminating federal 
court review of actions pursued under the November order, what 
would prevent future chief executives from recurring to this same 
authority whenever they perceive or allege the existence of new 
emergencies?284 Granting the Bush Administration's apparent as-
sumption that the presidential role as commander-in-chief permits the 
officer to preclude all judicial interference with the war on terrorism's 
prosecution, even insofar as suspects arrested domestically are con-
cerned, it would seem to follow that chief executives could suspend 
federal court jurisdiction anytime its exercise niight frustrate military 
efforts. In light of modern warfare's realities, which pit not only sol-
dier against soldier but also the economic and technological devel-
opment of nation against nation, the presidential power to proscribe 
federal judicial jurisdiction would, indeed, cover an extensive spec-
trum of cases and controversies. 285 We submit that here, as with 
furter, J., concurring) (stating "[t]he accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day 
[but] slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that 
fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority"). 
283. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also infra text accom-
panying note 295. 
284. See generally ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN 
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987) (concluding that governmental pow-
ers first asserted in a time of crisis are often stabilized and resorted to even after the crisis 
has subsided); infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
285. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
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Youngstown, such a sweeping conceptualization of the commander-
in-chief's authority directly contravenes Justice Black's declaration 
that the "Constitution [did] not subject th[e] lawmaking power of 
Congress to presidential or military supervision or control." 286 This 
perception similarly conflicts with Justice Jackson's statement that 
"the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in 
Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants."287 James 
Madison correspondingly observed in The Federalist No 47: "The ac-
cumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, 
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very defini-
tion of tyranny."288 
When, as here, the authority claimed is the power to shelter the 
president's own executive orders and other instructions from any ju-
dicial consideration, the danger of future abuse seems even greater 
than in Youngstown. The United States enjoys a venerable, but si-
multaneously fragile, tradition that its governmental officials are not 
above, but rather subject to, the law.289 Throughout American his-
tory, the federal courts have vigilantly guaranteed that those officers, 
including chief executives, stayed within lawful bounds.290 Recogni-
tion of presidential authority (in addition to, and distinct from, that of 
57 (1981); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 
34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994). 
286. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. See also supra notes 134-36, 139, 141 and ac-
companying text. 
287. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776) (charging that the King has "af-
fected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power"); Laird v. 
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 19 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (concluding that this clause restricts 
the military's power); supra notes 91, 134-36, 191-92 and accompanying text. 
288. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 219, at 301 (James Madison). See also Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1957) (declaring that the "blending of executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers in one person or even in one branch of government is ordinarily regarded 
as the very acme of absolutism"); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) (Bur-
ton, J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the Founders "were opposed to governments that 
placed in the hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws"). 
289. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 219, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (em-
phasizing that the president, unlike a monarch, is subject to the rule of law). For examples, 
see supra notes 164, 214. 
290. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997) (observing that "we have long 
held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine 
whether he has acted within the law"). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974); supra notes 164, 190, 214 and accompanying text. 
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Congress )291 for dispensing with the salutary check afforded by the re-
view of an independent, co-equal federal judiciary, jeopardizes a 
principle dramatically more fundamental than the separation of pow-
ers, namely "that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that 
we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules." 292 
For these reasons, even if searching federal court review of de-
tention decisions and related initiatives undertaken pursuant to the 
Bush Order invalidates no single Administration action, we believe 
judicial scrutiny has intrinsic value. Therefore, the Chief Executive 
must eschew the directive's provisions that authorize indefinite deten-
tion of non-citizens, thereby submitting to federal habeas corpus re-
view the lawfulness of any challenged custody. The Bush Administra-
tion should consult and follow the World War II example that 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt set in Quirin. The Roosevelt 
Administration did not invoke the proviso in its military commissions 
proclamation which denied accused persons federal court access; in-
stead, the administration submitted to the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion and, accordingly, permitted federal judicial review of military tri-
als. 293 President Bush and executive branch officials have thus far 
exhibited commendable restraint, especially by prosecuting several 
high-profile defendants in federal court, rather than in military tribu-
nals.294 Should the Administration modify this practice and ignore the 
Roosevelt precedent, a federal court, in an appropriate case, would 
have the power and the duty to hold unconstitutional the Executive 
Order's most extreme features. 
291. See supra notes 21-48 and accompanying text. 
292. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 646 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also supra note 194 and 
accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 17, 19, 85. See also Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Gold-
man, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 
HARV. J. L & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-59 (2002); Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Mili-
tary Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001 at Al4. We emphatically disavow the Roose-
velt administration's discredited actions recounted, and approved, in the case of Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also supra note 191 and accompanying 
text, infra note 296 and accompanying text. 
294. See Dan Eggen & Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Won't Seek Death for Walker, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al; David Johnston & Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The 
Government's Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al; Steven Lubet, editorial, A Muslim 
Lawyer for Moussaoui, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002, at A31; Katherine Q. Seelye, Lindh 
Lawyers and Prosecutors Spar Over Secret Witness, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at Al8; 
Philip Shenon, Sept. 11 Defendant Who Wants to Represent Self Is Busy Doing So, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at A22. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; U.S. 
Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, supra note 78. 
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VI. Conclusion 
President George W. Bush responded to the heinous September 
11 terrorist attacks by issuing an Executive Order that not only 
authorized military commissions to try individuals whom the United 
States prosecutes domestically for crimes implicating terrorism but 
also denied these persons access to federal court. President Bush's 
assertion of power usurps legislative authority that the Constitution 
expressly grants Congress to establish the judiciary and delineate its 
jurisdiction. We urge the Bush Administration to forego reliance on 
the provision that ostensibly precludes federal courts from reviewing 
detentions or military commission judgments under the Order. This 
claim to power would undermine legislative and judicial authority, 
threatening the delicate balance among the federal government's 
branches. 
President Bush should heed the trenchant admonitions uttered in 
closely-related contexts more than one half century ago by Justice 
Robert Jackson, a preeminent American jurist. Jackson astutely 
warned: 
[The] vague, undefined and undefinable 'war power' [is] the 
most dangerous one to free government in the whole catalogue 
of powers [, because] [i]t usually is invoked in haste and excite-
ment when calm legislative consideration of constitutional limi-
tation is difficult [and] [i]t is executed in a time of patriotic fer-
vor that makes moderation unpopular.295 
President Bush must similarly reject the principle of executive branch 
supremacy which "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand 
of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need"296 and upon which the Bush Administration has seized, as this 
295. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) ("It would indeed be ironic if, in 
the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liber-
ties ... which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.") See generally TRIBE, supra 
note 7, at 669-70; supra note 182, supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
296. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963): 
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights ... under the gravest of 
emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, un-
der the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dis-
pense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit 
governmental action. 
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866) ("No doctrine, involving more perni-
cious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any [constitutional] 
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.") See gen-
erally supra notes 191, 293 and accompanying text. 
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precept's application could jeopardize the Constitution that has 
served the United States exceptionally well for two centuries.297 
297. With all due respect, the failure to follow the sage advice proffered by Justice 
Jackson could warrant comparison between George Bush and President Truman, whose 
assertion of power for seizing U.S. steel mills the jurist analogized to the "prerogatives ex-
ercised by George III." See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
